

TOMORROW starts here.



Cisco *live!*

Design and Deployment of SourceFire NGIPS and NGFWL

BRKSEC - 2024

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Abstract


Overview of Session

- This technical session covers the FirePOWER security appliance product line and how it uniquely uses context to deliver true next generation network security capabilities including NGIPS, NGFW, and AMP (Next Generation IPS, Next Generation Firewall, and Advanced Malware Protection).
- The session will begin with a detailed review of the FirePOWER architecture including hardware acceleration, packet, flow and stream processing, and then move on to introduce why network context from FireSIGHT is a vital component in delivering these next generation services.
- Followed by a detailed review of Advanced Malware Protection, and how it uses context in detailing Malware behaviour.
- Deployment Scenarios.

Agenda

- **Why do we need NGIPS or Advanced Malware Protection?**
- **What is FirePOWER?** Performance and functional characteristics
- Packet and flow processing (day in the life of a stream)
- **What is FireSIGHT?**
- Awareness and the Network Map
- Why this context is vital in modern networks
- **FirePOWER: Security deployment modes**
- NGIPS
- NGFW
- Advanced Malware Protection (AMP)
- Deployment Scenarios / Considerations

Why do we Need NGIPS & Advanced Malware Detection?



- Hackers
- State Based Actors
- Criminals
- Insider Threats
- Compliance
- Due Diligence
- Knowledge!



27,375,000 *malware detection updates in FireAMP during 2013*

Where did it all Start?



Marty Roesch



Threat Focused Approach to Network Security

Access Control

- Remote Access VPN
- Gateway VPN Switching
- Routing
- NAT
- Stateful Inspection

App Control

- Detection of applications
- Allow/block apps and app sub-functions
- Allow/block apps by user
- Allow/block apps by type, tag, category, risk rating

Threat Prevention

- Vulnerability facing rules
- Threat facing rules
- Enterprise accuracy and performance

Context Awareness

- Correlate host and user activity
- Passive OS Fingerprinting
- Passive Service Identification
- Passive Vulnerability mapping
- Passive Network Discovery
- Auto Policy Recommendations
- Auto Impact Assessment

Typical Firewall

Typical IPS

Typical NGFWs

FirePOWER NGIPS

FirePOWER – NGFW




FirePOWER Platform - Overview

What is FirePOWER?

- Industry-leading security platform
- Unmatched performance from a single-pass, low-latency design
- Configuration flexibility
- Standard platform for delivering the Sourcefire network capability
- NGIPS, NGFW & AMP




FirePOWER Platform



FirePOWER Platform

IPS Throughput



Modular Connectivity

Stackable

Fixed Connectivity


Mixed / SFP



FirePOWER Scalability

- Up to four 8250 chassis can be stacked


Number of chassis	IPS Throughput
1	10Gbps
2	20Gbps
3	30Gbps
4	40Gbps



New FirePower Appliances – 8300 Series


Current 8200 Offerings

IPS Throughput



New 8300 Offerings

IPS Throughput







8300 Series – Performance Specifications

	Rack Height	NGIPS Throughput	Maximum Monitoring Interfaces (1Gbs)	x86 Cores/ threads and # Microengines	Netmod Bays	Stacking
8350	2U	15Gbps	28	20/40 and 80	7	Yes, with additional 8350 appliances.
8360	4U	30Gbps	24	40/80 and 160	6	Yes, with additional 8350 appliances.
8370	6U	45Gbps	20	60/120 and 240	5	Yes, with additional 8350 appliances.
8390	8U	60Gbps	16	80/160 and 320	4	Yes, with additional 8350 appliances.

FirePOWER - 7010,7020,7030

- Half Width Chassis – Fixed 8 Port Copper
 - Low Latency
 - LCD Screen
 - Integrated LOM
 - Solid State Drive



Model	Acceleration	RAM	IPS Throughput	Modes
3D7030		4GB	250 Mbps	NGIPS, NGFW, AMP
3D7020		4GB	100 Mbps	NGIPS, NGFW, AMP
3D7010		4GB	50 Mbps	NGIPS, NGFW, AMP


FirePOWER – Defence Centres (Mgmt Console)

Defense Center



	DC750	DC1500	DC3500
Performance and Functionality			
Maximum Sensors Managed [1]	10	35	150
Maximum Network Map Size - Hosts	2,000	50,000	300,000
Maximum Network Map Size - Users	2,000	50,000	300,000
Maximum IPS Event Storage	20 Million	30 Million	150 Million
Maximum IPS Event Rate (per second)	2,000	6,000	10,000
Maximum Flow Data Rate (per second)	2,000	6,000	10,000
Management Interface	10/100/1000 RJ45		10/100/1000 RJ45
Memory (RAM)	2GB	6GB	12GB
Event Storage Space	100GB	125GB	400GB
Can function as Master Defense Center	No	No	Yes
Redundancy Features			
Supports High Availability	No	Yes	Yes
Dual Power Supplies	No	No	Yes
RAID Support	No	RAID 1	RAID 5

FirePOWER – Virtual



- **Virtual Sensor**
 - Inline or passive deployment
 - Full NGIPS Capabilities
 - Deployed as virtual appliance
 - Use Cases
 - SNORT Conversion
 - Small / Remote Sites
 - Virtualized workloads (PCI)




- **Virtual Defense Center**
 - Manages up to 25 sensors
 - physical and virtual
 - single pane-of-glass
 - Use Cases
 - Rapid Evaluation
 - Pre-production Testing
 - Service Providers



FirePOWER Architecture

The Power of Hardware & Software Combined




Enables industry leading, energy efficient performance for Sourcefire NGIPS | NGFW

firePOWER™
Technology


Custom designed, specialised network processor accelerates data acquisition and classification.

Single Pass Architecture




Single Pass Architecture

firePOWER™




FirePOWER Architecture – V5.X




Life of a Flow

- Hardware processing
- Initial processing
 - IP Blacklist (Security Intelligence)
 - Flows that are blocked/trusted via AC rules
- Network Layer Processing
 - IP Defrag Frag, Stream, Rate Based Attack
- Application Identification
- AC Rule Evaluation
- Network Discovery
- IPS & File Processing




Life of a Flow

- Hardware Processing
 - Look for flow in flow state table
 - Create if not there
 - If flow has disposition of Block or Trust, take immediate action
- Evaluate hardware rules
- If block or trust, mark entry in flow state table
- Take action on rule
- If inspect
 - Store information about AC rule and Start Inspection




Life of a Flow

- Initial processing
 - Packet decoding
 - IP Blacklist (Security Intelligence)
 - immediately mark flow as blocked, update hardware flow state
 - monitor - mark flow, log later
- Network Layer Processing
 - IP Defragmentation/Connection Tracking/TCP Stream reassembly
 - Connection tracking by IPs, Ports, VLAN, IP Protocol, MPLS Label, In/Out zones unique ID
- Application Identification
 - When needed for AC rules




Life of a Flow

- AC Rule evaluation
 - Can match Zones, VLAN, IPs, Ports & User/Group based on packet header
- Need App ID for matching Applications and URLs
 - Packets continue to flow until Application is identified and the rule criteria can be matched or considered a non-match
 - If Application not yet determined, IPS policy from Default is used (“No Rules Active” if that is Block or Trust)
 - If action of block/trust
 - Immediately mark flow, update hardware flow state
- If action of allow
 - Select IPS policy?
 - Select File policy?




Life of a Flow

- Network Discovery
 - Only if within Networks Discovery Policy
 - Hosts, users, applications
- App ID
 - Leverage information from earlier if done for AC rule
- Network Map Events




Life of a Flow

- IPS
- IPS Event logging for Decode/Frag/Stream events
 - May block flow at this point
- Application Preprocessors
 - HTTP Inspect, FTP/Telnet, SMTP, POP, IMAP, DCE/RPC, DNS, DNP3, Modbus, GTP, SSH, SSL
- IPS Rules
 - Leverage Application Protocol ID to select rules
- IPS Events
 - if block, mark flow as blocked, update hardware flow state



Life of a Flow

- File Processing
- Leverage HTTP, SMTP, POP, IMAP, FTP preprocessors
- File type ID
 - Usually within first part of the file
- Malware signature calculation & lookup
 - Requires entire file
- Blocking & Logging of File events





FireSight - Context

Got a lot of Data? – Well what was the question?



Why is Context Important?

Event +
network &
user context

Event: Attempted Privilege Gain
Target: 96.16.242.135 (vulnerable)
Host OS: Blackberry
Apps: Mail, Browser, Twitter
Location: Whitehouse, US
User ID: bobama
Full Name: Barack Obama
Department: Executive Office

Event +
network
context


Event: Attempted Privilege Gain
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Event


Event: Attempted Privilege Gain
Target: 96.16.242.135

Dashboard - Context


Browse all application traffic...




Look for risky applications



What else have these users been up to?



On what operating systems?













What does their traffic look like over time?



Context - Geolocation

Top Events by Source Country

Country Name	Count
 United States	162
 Germany	36
 China	18
 Japan	13
 France	11
 Russia	4
 North Korea	2
 Pakistan	1
 Iraq	1
 Iran	1

Last updated 1 minutes ago

Initiator IP	Initiator Location	Responder IP
 76.100.209.66	 USA	 10.4.32.112
 10.4.10.131		 10.4.32.112
 10.4.10.131		 10.4.32.112
 10.4.33.95		 10.5.32.206
 89.188.101.82	 ISR	 10.5.32.206
 200.189.215.85	 BRA	 10.4.33.44
 10.4.31.237		 10.5.32.206
 10.4.11.216		 10.5.39.206

- Visualise and map countries, cities of hosts, events

Network AMP - Context

File Trajectory for 8fe98673...267e06b9

File SHA256 8fe98673...267e06b9
File Name sample.msi
File Type MSOLE2
File Category Office_Documents

First Seen 2013-01-16 12:29:18 on 10.22.75.2
Last Seen 2013-01-16 14:42:11 on 10.22.75.18
Event Count 6
Seen On 4 Hosts (2 senders, 4 receivers)
Current Disposition Malware

Trajectory

Jan 12: 14:42

10.22.75.2
10.5.32.125
10.22.75.7
10.22.75.18


Events

Time	Event...	Sending IP	Receiving IP	File Name	Dispo...	Action	Pro...	Client	We...	Description
2013-01-16 12:29:18	Transfer	10.22.75.2	10.5.32.125	sample.msi	Malware	Malware Cloud Lookup	SMTP	Thunderbird		
2013-01-16 12:29:20	Transfer	10.5.32.125	10.22.75.7	sample.msi	Malware	Malware Cloud Lookup	IMAP	IMAP client		
2013-01-16 12:29:20	Transfer	10.5.32.125	10.22.75.7	sample.msi	Malware	Malware Cloud Lookup	IMAP	IMAP client		
2013-01-16 12:29:24	Transfer	10.5.32.125	10.22.75.2	sample.msi	Malware	Malware Cloud Lookup	POP3	POP3 client		

Last login on Wednesday, 2013-01-16 at 09:43:02 AM from 10.2.100.228

Systems Infected

The time of entry



Advanced Malware Protection - AMP

AMP - Overview

Complete advanced malware protection suite to protect networks and devices

fireAMP™

- Dedicated Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) appliance
- Advanced Malware Protection Subscription for FirePOWER appliances
- Advanced malware protection for hosts virtual and mobile devices



firePOWER™




AMP

ANDROID

Cisco *live!*

AMP - Overview



Defence Centre

Event Stream

Advanced Malware Protection

- Malware detection of files across the wire
- In-line **Retrospective Security** for continuous analysis and detection including retrospective alerts
- Security Intelligence for outbound / C&C

Event Stream




Control: FireAMP Connectors (Client/Mobile/Virtual)

- Provide:
- Enhanced Intelligence
 - Cleanup Capabilities

AMP – Device trajectory

Device Trajectory for Java-0-Day



AMP Context – Threat Root Cause


Threat Root Cause

Select Dates

February 10 2014 – February 11 2014 [Reload](#)

Overview **Details** Timeline

Program	Threat Name	Version	Threats Introduced	Computers Affected	Event Type
explorer.exe		6.0.2900.5512	11	6	6 executed 5 moved
a.exe			6	1	2 created 2 executed 2 moved
java.exe		7.0.100.18	5	1	3 created 1 executed 1 moved

Detected **Kazy:Troj_Generic-tpd** as **n (c9dbfc2...dc5600)** [HTML] . 

Created by **zaccess8308073210892168095.exe (87715c2..041f20)** [HTML] executing as **u@ZACCESSDRIVEBY2**.

The file was **not quarantined**. In audit only mode.

At 22:05:11, Mon Feb 10 2014 UTC

[\[less details \]](#)

File full path: **C:\\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-1089625888-3054005746-3039903294-1000\\$\$ff20833dbb78e410a1126d2ca0eecb73**n

File SHA-1: **9f9ccc367265c8e04747004f4bb122d6084c9bd79**.

File MD5: **69bc8b1dcfde7443d90d4b34b45bd193**.

File size: **53248** bytes.

Parent file SHA-1: **0800d75067f8066eabf01341d329f3f7b4126b6b**.

Parent file MD5: **0bff47833c0ddb262bc2152e040381e2**.















Parent file size: **174592** bytes.

Parent process id: **4016**.

Parent process SID: **S-1-5-21-1089625888-3054005746-3039903294-1000**.

Detected by the SHA engines.

AMP Context – Explorer Details

 Demo_Tinba detected a Suspected Botnet connection		 Botnet	12:40 PM EST, 2/11/2014	
 Demo_TDSS executed malware detected as Eldorado:Alureon-tpd in file unknown			 Executed Malware	12:40 PM EST, 2/11/2014
 Demo_Tinba executed malware detected as W32.Variant:Tinba.15hl.1201 in file unknown			 Executed Malware	12:40 PM EST, 2/11/2014
 Demo_Sality executed malware detected as W32.Sality:SmallHKN.d3da2.vv in file unknown			 Executed Malware	12:40 PM EST, 2/11/2014
 Demo_Rimecud executed malware detected as Rimecud:MalPack-tpd in file unknown			 Executed Malware	12:40 PM EST, 2/11/2014
 Demo_Ramnit executed malware detected as W32.Ramnit.A in file unknown			 Executed Malware	12:20 PM EST, 2/11/2014
 Demo_Stabunig executed malware detected as W32.Variant:Stabunig.15nx.1201 in file unknown			 Executed Malware	12:03 PM EST, 2/11/2014
 Demo_TDSS detected Eldorado:Alureon-tpd as tdss.exe			 Quarantine: Not Seen	9:11 AM EST, 2/11/2014
 Demo_TDSS detected Eldorado:Alureon-tpd as tdss.exe			 Quarantine: Not Seen	9:09 AM EST, 2/11/2014
 Demo_TDSS detected Eldorado:Alureon-tpd as tdss.exe			 Quarantine: Not Seen	9:09 AM EST, 2/11/2014
 Demo Tinba accessed remote computer at: 82.165.37.127:80		 Network Threat :DFC.CustomIPList	9:09 AM EST, 2/11/2014	

AMP Context – IOC's

Indications of Compromise	
Demo_ZAccess	ⓘ Mark Resolved
Threat Detected , Java compromise , Executed malware , Potential Dropper Infection	
Demo_SFEicar	ⓘ Mark Resolved
Threat Detected , Adobe Reader compromise , Executed malware	
Demo_Stabunig	ⓘ Mark Resolved
Executed malware , Threat Detected	
Demo_Zbot	ⓘ Mark Resolved
Threat Detected , Executed malware , Potential Dropper Infection	
Demo_Ramnit	ⓘ Mark Resolved
Threat Detected , Executed malware	
Demo_TDSS	ⓘ Mark Resolved
Threat Detected , Executed malware	
Demo_Tinba	ⓘ Mark Resolved
Suspected botnet connection , Executed malware , Threat Detected	
Demo_Sality	ⓘ Mark Resolved
Executed malware , Threat Detected	
Demo_Rimecud	ⓘ Mark Resolved
Executed malware , Threat Detected	

- Indicators of Compromise
 - Monitor and Analyse files potential Malware traits
 - Monitors the now & retrospectively convicts files
 - Filters and sorts the most important events
 - Tells the analyst what is happening to reduce TCO
 - Quick links to trajectory
 - Search for SHA's (fingerprints, list all computers that have the file)

BEFORE

See it,
Control it

DURING

Intelligent &
Context Aware

AFTER

Retrospective
Security

Vulnerability Management



Custom Detection



Full Packet Capture



NAC



Incident Response




Network Access/Data Capture



Visualisation



SIEM



FireSIGHT Management Centre

Sourcefire STP Program – API Framework



Deployment Scenarios / Considerations

Deployment Scenarios / Usage – NGIPS / NGFW

- Data Centre GW
- Partner Networks / OGO's
- Branch Office Links
- ISP feeds
- DMZs
- Segregated PCI LAN
- Out of band management LAN
- VLAN's
- Internal (Core) LAN
- Critical Infrastructure LAN
- Traditional IDS / IPS
- Malware Detection
- Data Exfiltration (insider threat)
- Bandwidth Hogs
- Improper use of Corporate systems
 - (Websites / BitTorrent)
- Compliance PII / PCI data breaches
- Application usage / control and adherence to policies
- BYOD
- Due Diligence

Deployment Scenarios / Usage – Virtual

- Partner Networks / OGO's
- Branch Office Links
- DMZs
- Segregated PCI LAN
- Out of band management LAN
- VLAN's
- Internal (Core) LAN
- Critical Infrastructure LAN
- Deployed Infrastructure (Defence)
- Cloud Services
- Traditional IDS / IPS
- Malware Detection
- Data Exfiltration (insider threat)
- Bandwidth Hogs
- Improper use of Corporate systems
 - (Websites / BitTorrent)
- Compliance PII / PCI data breaches
- Application usage / control and adherence to policies
- BYOD
- Due Diligence
- Resilience!



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