

TOMORROW starts here.



Cisco *live!*

Advanced Threat Defence using NetFlow

BRKSEC-2073

Matthew Robertson

Security Technical Marketing Engineer



"The whole art of war consists of guessing at what is on the other side of the hill."
Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington

Evolution of Cyber Conflict

Manual Attacks (1980s)

War Dialing, Phone Phreaking ...

Mechanised Attacks (1988)

Viruses, Worms ...

Talented Human / Mechanised Attackers (2009)

APT, Multi-Step Attacks...

Google, RSA ...

DIY Human / Mechanised Attackers (2011)

Cryptocurrency Ransoms, Store-bought Credentials ...

Target, Neiman Marcus ...

Manual Defences

Unplug

Mechanised Defences

Firewall, IDS/IPS


Targeted Human/Mechanised

Reputation, App-aware Firewall

Intelligence Driven Human Defenders

Defending against Humans

Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months



A Cyberattack From China: TimesCast: Chinese hackers infiltrated The New York Times's computer systems, getting passwords for its reporters and others.

By NICOLE PERLROTH

Published: January 30, 2013 | 391 Comments

SAN FRANCISCO — For the last four months, Chinese hackers have persistently attacked The New York Times, infiltrating its computer systems and getting passwords for its reporters and other employees.

[点击查看本中文版](#)

After surreptitiously tracking the intruders to study their movements

FACEBOOK

TWITTER

GOOGLE+

SAVE

E-MAIL

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackers-infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html>

Readers shared their thoughts on this article.


[Read All Comments \(391\) »](#)

security experts have expelled the attackers and kept them from breaking back in.

PRINT

REPRINTS

Agenda



About the Speaker




Matthew Robertson

- Security Technical Marketing Engineer
- ½ year at Lancope
- 5½ years at Cisco
 - Development and Technical Marketing
- Focused on advanced threat detection
- I am Canadian!



Thinking Beyond the Perimeter

Modern threats are consistently bypassing the security perimeter as they redraw the map



Hiding in plain sight

Polar Bear




Signals Intelligence

Traffic Analysis:

- Deduce information from communication patterns




NetFlow




Start Time	Interface	Src IP	Src Port	Dest IP	Dest Port	Proto	Pkts Sent	Bytes Sent	TCP Flags
10:20:12.221	eth0/1	10.2.2.2	1024	10.1.1.1	80	TCP	5	1025	SYN,ACK,PSH
10:20:12.871	eth0/2	10.1.1.1	80	10.2.2.2	1024	TCP	17	28712	SYN,ACK,FIN

NetFlow = Visibility


A single NetFlow Record provides a wealth of information



Agenda



NetFlow Deployment Architecture



Management/Reporting Layer:

- Run queries on flow data
- Centralise management and reporting

Flow Collection Layer:

- Collection, storage and analysis of flow records

Flow Exporting Layer:

- Enables telemetry export
- As close to the traffic source as possible

Considerations: Flow Exporting Layer



1. NetFlow support
2. Which version of NetFlow to use
3. How to configure/what to measure
4. Where in the network to enable NetFlow export

Cisco NetFlow Support



Versions of NetFlow

Version	Major Advantage	Limits/Weaknesses
V5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defines 18 exported fields Simple and compact format Most commonly used format 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IPv4 only Fixed fields, fixed length fields only Single flow cache
V9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Template-based IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets MPLS and BGP nexthop supported Defines 104 fields, including L2 fields Reports flow direction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets Fixed length fields only Uses more memory Slower performance Single flow cache
Flexible NetFlow (FNF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Template-based flow format (built on V9 protocol) Supports flow monitors (discrete caches) Supports selectable key fields and IPv6 Supports NBAR data fields 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Less common Requires more sophisticated platform to produce Requires more sophisticated system to consume
IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) AKA NetFlow V10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Standardised – RFC 5101, 5102, 6313 Supports variable length fields, NBAR2 Can export flows via IPv4 and IPv6 packets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Even less common Only supported on a few Cisco platforms
NSEL (ASA only)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Built on NetFlow v9 protocol State-based flow logging (context) Pre and Post NAT reporting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Missing many standard fields Limited support by collectors

Configuring Flexible NetFlow

1. Configure the Exporter

```
Router(config)# flow exporter my-exporter  
Router(config-flow-exporter)# destination 1.1.1.1
```

Best Practice:
include all v5 fields

2. Configure the Flow Record

```
Router(config)# flow record my-record  
Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 destination address  
Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 source address  
Router(config-flow-record)# collect counter bytes
```

3. Configure the Flow Monitor


```
Router(config)# flow monitor my-monitor  
Router(config-flow-monitor)# exporter my-exporter  
Router(config-flow-monitor)# record my-record
```

4. Apply to an Interface

```
Router(config)# interface s3/0  
Router(config-if)# ip flow monitor my-monitor input
```

NetFlow Deployment

Each network layer offers unique NetFlow capabilities



NetFlow Deployment



Access:

- New network edge
 - Detect threats as they enter the network
- Detect threats inside the switch
 - east-west
 - Layer 2 traffic
- Fewer false positives
 - Higher-granular visibility
- Identify the endpoint
 - collect MAC Address

Catalyst 3650-X,3750-X Flow Record

```
!  
flow record CYBER_3KX_FLOW_RECORD match datalink mac source-  
address  
match datalink mac destination-address  
match datalink mac source-vlan-id  
match ipv4 tos  
match ipv4 ttl  
match ipv4 protocol  
match ipv4 source address  
match ipv4 destination address  
match transport source-port  
match transport destination-port collect interface input snmp collect  
interface output snmp collect counter bytes collect counter packets collect  
timestamp sys-uptime first  
collect timestamp sys-uptime last  
!
```



For Your
Reference

Catalyst 4500 Flow Record

```
!  
flow record CYBER_4K_FLOW_RECORD  
match ipv4 tos  
match ipv4 protocol  
match ipv4 source address match ipv4 destination address  
match transport source-port  
match transport destination-port  
collect ipv4 dscp  
collect ipv4 ttl minimum  
collect ipv4 ttl maximum  
collect transport tcp flags  
collect interface output  
collect counter bytes  
collect counter packets  
collect timestamp sys-uptime first  
collect timestamp sys-uptime last  
!
```



For Your
Reference


NetFlow Deployment - Converged Access



Converged Access:

- NetFlow for the first time on Wireless
- Visibility in BYOD environments
- Consistent configuration for wired and wireless
 - Single flow monitor can be applied to wired ports and SSID
- Natively available in the UADP ASIC
- Can monitor East-West and North-South flows
 - 48k flows on the 48 port model

NetFlow Deployment



Distribution & Core:

- Traditional deployment
 - Minimal recommended deployment
- Enable at critical points/bottle necks
- Typically done on a Layer 3 boundary
- Detect threats internal to the VLAN
 - When deployed on an SVI interface
- Detect threats as they traverse the internal network
 - Move between subnets

Catalyst 6500 (Sup 2T) Flow Record

```
!  
flow record CYBER_6K_FLOW_RECORD  
match ipv4 tos  
match ipv4 protocol  
match ipv4 source address  
match ipv4 destination address  
match transport source-port  
match transport destination-port  
match interface input  
collect transport tcp flags  
collect interface output  
collect counter bytes  
collect counter packets  
collect timestamp sys-uptime first  
collect timestamp sys-uptime last  
!
```



For Your
Reference

NetFlow Deployment



Edge:

- Detect threats as they enter and leave the network
- Monitor communication between branches
- Gain context from edge devices
 - Application - NBAR
 - Events & User-ID - NSEL

ISR Flow Record

```
! flow record CYBER_ISR_RECORD
match ipv4 tos
match ipv4 protocol
match ipv4 source address
match ipv4 destination address
match transport source-port
match transport destination-port
match interface input
collect routing next-hop address ipv4
collect ipv4 dscp
collect ipv4 ttl minimum
collect ipv4 ttl maximum
collect transport tcp flags
collect interface output
collect counter bytes
collect counter packets
collect timestamp sys-uptime first
collect timestamp sys-uptime last
collect application name
!
```



For Your
Reference

Enable NBAR

ASA NSEL Configuration

```
!  
flow-export destination management <ip-address> 2055  
!  
policy-map global_policy  
  class class-default  
    flow-export event-type all destination <ip-address>  
!  
flow-export template timeout-rate 2  
logging flow-export syslogs disable  
!
```



For Your
Reference

Flow Monitor Configuration

```
!  
flow monitor CYBER_MONITOR record CYBER_RECORD  
  exporter CYBER_EXPORTER  
  cache timeout active 60  
  cache timeout inactive 15  
!
```

Inactive Timeout:

- How long a flow can be inactive before being removed from cache
- Recommended 15 seconds
- All exporters should have the same timeout


Active Timeout:

- Longest amount of time a flow can be in cache without exporting a Flow Record
- Recommended 60 seconds
- All exporters should have the same timeout

Aside: Myths about NetFlow Generation

Myth #1: NetFlow impacts performance


- Hardware implemented NetFlow has no performance impact
- Software implementation is typically significantly <15% processing overhead




Myth #2: NetFlow has bandwidth overhead

- NetFlow is a summary protocol
- Traffic overhead is typically significantly <1% of total traffic per exporting device

Agenda



Flow Collection Considerations



Components for NetFlow Security Monitoring

StealthWatch Management Console

- Management and reporting
- Up to 25 FlowCollectors
- Up to 3 million fps globally

StealthWatch FlowReplicator

- UDP Packet copier
- Forward to multiple collection systems


StealthWatch FlowCollector

- Collect and analyse
- Up to 2000 sources
- Up to sustained 120,000 fps

Best Practice: Centralise collection globally


StealthWatch FlowSensor

- Generate NetFlow data
- ## StealthWatch FlowSensor VE
- Virtual environment
 - Visibility into ESX



NetFlow Collection: Flow Stitching

Uni-directional flow records



Start Time	Interface	Src IP	Src Port	Dest IP	Dest Port	Proto	Pkts Sent	Bytes Sent
10:20:12.221	eth0/1	10.2.2.2	1024	10.1.1.1	80	TCP	5	1025
10:20:12.871	eth0/2	10.1.1.1	80	10.2.2.2	1024	TCP	17	28712



Start Time	Client IP	Client Port	Server IP	Server Port	Proto	Client Bytes	Client Pkts	Server Bytes	Server Pkts	Interfaces
10:20:12.221	10.2.2.2	1024	10.1.1.1	80	TCP	1025	5	28712	17	eth0/1 eth0/2

Bi-directional:


- Conversation flow record
- Allows easy visualisation and analysis

NetFlow Collection: De-duplication


Duplicates

- Router A: 10.2.2.2:1024 -> 10.1.1.1:80
- Router B: 10.2.2.2:1024 -> 10.1.1.1:80
- Router C: 10.1.1.1:80 -> 10.2.2.2:1024

- Without de-duplication:
 - Traffic volume can be misreported
 - False positive would occur
- Allows for the efficient storage of flow data
- Necessary for accurate host-level reporting
- Does not discard data



Conversational Flow Record




When


Search Subject Details	Totals	Peer Details
Packets: 56.08K	Packets: 111K	Packets: 54.92K
Packet Rate: 467.32pps	Packet Rate: 924.96pps	Packet Rate: 457.64pps
Bytes: 69.17MB	Bytes: 136.91MB	Bytes: 67.74MB
Byte Rate: 604.4Kbps	Byte Rate: 1.2Mbps	Byte Rate: 591.91Kbps
Percent Transfer: 50.5%	Search Subject/Peer Ratio: 1.02	Percent Transfer: 49.5%
NAT: 209.182.184.8	TCP Connections: 3	Host Groups: Switzerland
Host Groups: Sales and Marketing, End User Devices, Atl anta	RTT: 306ms	Payload: HEAD http://au.download.windowsupdate.com/m sdownload/update/software/crup/2012/12/proof-en-us_82ec9 84db73a712e4b54cb1fe93738c82afde551.cab
Payload: 200 OK	SRT: 3ms	

More Details

Integrating with a SIEM



Agenda



Context is Critical



ISE as a Telemetry Source

Monitor Mode

- Open Mode, Multi-Auth
- Unobstructed Access
- No impact on productivity
- Profiling, posture assessment
- Gain Visibility

- Maintain historical session table
- Correlate NetFlow to username
- Build User-centric reports



syslog



Start Active Time	End Active Time	User Name	Host	Device Type	MAC Address
Apr 15, 2013 2:08:33 PM (17 minutes 18s ago)	Current	student01	192.168.103.101	VMWare-Device	00:50:56:85:5c:3d (VMWare, Inc.)
Apr 15, 2013 2:08:21 PM (17 minutes 18s ago)	Current	DEMO\student04	192.168.104.100	WindowsXP-Workstation	00:50:56:85:13:c4 (VMWare, Inc.)
Apr 15, 2013 2:08:21 PM (17 minutes 18s ago)	Current	host/pod08-mgmt.demo.local	192.168.108.100	WindowsXP-Workstation	00:50:56:85:13:cc (VMWare, Inc.)
Apr 15, 2013 2:08:21 PM (17 minutes 18s ago)	Current	host/pod09-mgmt.demo.local	192.168.109.100	WindowsXP-Workstation	00:50:56:85:13:ce (VMWare, Inc.)
Apr 15, 2013 2:08:21 PM (17 minutes 18s ago)	Current	DEMO\student05	192.168.105.100	WindowsXP-Workstation	00:50:56:85:13:c6 (VMWare, Inc.)

Time	Status	Details	Identity	Endpoint ID	IP Address	Network Device	Device Port	Authorization Profiles
Apr 15,13 02:08:33.241 PM	✓		student01	00:50:56:85:5C:3D	192.168.103.101	sw1	GigabitEthernet0/4	PermitAccess
Apr 15,13 02:08:21.241 PM	✓		DEMO\student04	00:50:56:85:13:C4	192.168.104.100	sw1	GigabitEthernet0/5	PermitAccess
Apr 15,13 02:08:21.219 PM	✓		host/pod08-mgmt.demo.local	00:50:56:85:13:CC	192.168.108.100	sw1	GigabitEthernet0/9	PermitAccess
Apr 15,13 02:08:21.192 PM	✓		host/pod09-mgmt.demo.local	00:50:56:85:13:CE	192.168.109.100	sw1	GigabitEthernet0/10	PermitAccess
Apr 15,13 02:08:21.144 PM	✓		DEMO\student05	00:50:56:85:13:C6	192.168.105.100	sw1	GigabitEthernet0/6	PermitAccess
Apr 15,13 02:08:21.082 PM	✓		DEMO\student07	00:50:56:85:13:CA	192.168.107.100	sw1	GigabitEthernet0/8	PermitAccess

Authenticated Session Table

Configuration: Logging on ISE

1. Create Remote Logging Target on ISE
2. Add Target to Logging Categories

1

Identity Services Engine

Home Operations Policy Administration

System Identity Management Network Resources Web Portal Management Feed Service

Deployment Licensing Certificates Logging Maintenance Backup & Restore Admin Access Settings

Logging

Local Log Settings

Remote Logging Targets

Logging Categories

Message Catalog

Debug Log Configuration

Collection Filters

Remote Logging Targets List > New Logging Target

Logging Target

Name: Lanclope_SMC Target Type: UDP SysLog

Description: Status: Enabled

* IP Address: 172.26.164.251 (Valid Range 1 to 65535)

* Port: 3514 (Valid Range 1 to 65535)

Facility Code: LOCAL6

* Maximum Length: 1024 (Valid Range 200 to 8192)

Include Alarms For this Target:

Submit Cancel

2

Identity Services Engine

Home Operations Policy Administration

System Identity Management Network Resources Web Portal Management Feed Service

Deployment Licensing Certificates Logging Maintenance Backup & Restore Admin Access Settings

Logging

Local Log Settings

Remote Logging Targets

Logging Categories

Message Catalog

Debug Log Configuration

Collection Filters

Logging Categories List > RADIUS Accounting

Logging Category

Name: RADIUS Accounting

Log Severity Level: INFO

(Log level can not be changed.)

Local Logging Targets:

Available: splunk1


Selected: Lanclope_SMC, LogCollector, LogCollector2, ProfilerRadiusProbe

Save Reset


Required Logging categories:

- RADIUS Accounting
- Profiler
- Administrative and Operational Audit

Configuration: Add ISE to SMC



1. (Not Shown) Create Admin User on ISE
2. (Not Shown) Configure ISE or CA certificate on SMC
3. (Shown) Add Cisco ISE to SMC Configuration
4. (Shown) Add additional ISE nodes



To collect data from these devices, you must enable RADIUS Accounting, Profiler, and Administrative and Operational Audit logging categories on all of the ISE devices in the cluster. For more information, click [here](#).

Name:

Collection Port:

User Name:

Password:

Cisco ISE Deployment Nodes


4. Add additional ISE nodes



Global Intelligence



List of known Command and Control Servers



Adding Situational Awareness


Flow Table – 29 records


Client Host	Client Host Groups	Server Host	Server Host Groups	Application	Duration	Total Traffic...	Start Active Time
10.201.3.149	Sales and Marketing, End User Devices, Atlanta	89.108.67.143	Russian Federation	HTTP	23s	256.56k	Jan 11, 2014 3:44:20 PM (9 hours 1 minute 26s ago)

Client Host	Client Host Group	Server Host	Server Host Groups	Application	Duration	Total Traffic	Start Active Time
10.201.3.149	Sales and Marketing, End User Devices	89.108.67.143	Russian Federation	HTTP	23s	256.56K	Jan 11, 2014


Adding Situational Awareness

Flow Table - 29 records

Client User Name	Client Host	Client Host Groups	Server Host	Server Host Groups	Application	Duration	Total Traffic...	Start Active Time
ken	10.201.3.149	Sales and Marketing, End User Devices, Atlanta	89.108.67.143 	Russian Federation, Zeus	HTTP	23s	256.56k	Jan 11, 2014 3:44:20 PM (9 hours 1 minute 26s ago)

Client User Name	Client Host	Client Host Group	Server Host	Server Host Groups	Application	Duration	Total Traffic	Start Active Time
Ken	10.201.3.149	Sales and Marketing, End User Devices	89.108.67.143 	Russian Federation, Zeus	HTTP	23s	256.56K	Jan 11, 2014


Agenda



Behavioural Analysis & Anomaly Detection

Behavioural Analysis:

- Leverages knowledge of known bad behaviour





Anomaly Detection:


- Identify a change from “normal”

StealthWatch: Indices


Concern Index: Track hosts that appear to compromising network integrity

Host Groups	Host	CI	CI%	Alarms	Alerts
Desktops, Atlanta	10.10.101.118	313,624,542	3,136% 	High Concern Index	Ping, Ping_Scan, TCP_Scan
New York, Desktops	10.50.100.83	190,075,544	1,901% 	High Concern Index, High File Sharing Index, High Total Traffic	Ping, Rejects, TCP_Scan

Target Index: Track hosts that appear to be victims of the suspicious behaviour of other hosts

Host Groups	Host	TI	TI%	Alarms	Alerts
Domain Controllers, Atlanta, DNS Servers, NTP Servers	10.10.30.15	118,019,003	11,802% 		Excess_Clients, Rejects

File Sharing Index: Tracks behaviour that is indicative of peer-to-peer activity

Host Groups	Host	FSI	FSI%	Alarms	Alerts
Atlanta, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.59	180,385	361% 	High Concern Index, High File Sharing Index, High Total Traffic	Ping, Ping_Scan, Port_Scan, TCP_Scan, TCP_Stealth

StealthWatch: Alarms

Alarms

- Indicate significant behaviour changes and policy violations
- Known and unknown attacks generate alarms
- Activity that falls outside the baseline, acceptable behaviour or established policies

!	✓	🔔	Policy	Start Active Time	Alarm	Source	Source Host Groups	Source Use...	Target	Details
!	✓	🔔	Desktops & Trusted Wireless	Apr 15, 2013 4:20:00 PM (7 minutes 7s ago)	Suspect Data Loss	10.10.101.89	Desktops, Atlanta	ud0158	Multiple Hosts	Observed 1.87G bytes. Policy maximum allows up to 500M bytes.

Host Groups

Host Group Editor for ACME

Find: Match Case

- Inside Hosts
 - Catch All
 - By Function
 - Business Units
 - DMZ
 - Guest Wireless Networks
 - Infrastructure
 - Internal 3rd Party Managed Devices
 - Other
 - Servers**
 - Antivirus Servers
 - Backup Servers
 - Compliance Servers
 - Confidential Servers
 - DHCP Servers
 - DNS Servers
 - Domain Controllers
 - File Servers
 - Lab Servers**
 - Mail Servers
 - NTP Servers
 - POD-XX Servers
 - SMS Servers
 - Web Servers
 - Users
 - VoIP
 - By Location
 - Outside Hosts
 - Command & Control Servers

Host Group

Id: 61

Name: Lab Servers

Ranges

10.11.0.0/16

Import Ranges...

Advanced Policy Options

- Enable baselining for Hosts in this Group:
- Disable CI Events using excluded services:
- Disable flood alarms and CI Events when a Host in this Group is the target:
- Trap Hosts that scan unused addresses in this Group:

Revert

Import... Export... Validate

Help

OK Cancel

Virtual container of multiple IP Addresses/ranges that have similar attributes

Best Practice: classify all known IP Addresses in one or more host groups

Policy Tuning

Role Policies

Name	Description	Assigned to Host Groups	Assigned to Ranges
Antivirus & SMS Servers	Suppress Scanning Activity	SMS Servers Antivirus Servers	
Backup Servers		Backup Servers	
Desktops & Trusted Wireless Devices		End User Devices Trusted Wireless	
	Increases Traffic Values for File Server Alarms	Web Servers File Servers	
		Proxy	
		Mail Servers	
		Network Scanners	
		Servers	
Trusted Internet Hosts	Suppress High Total Traffic, Suspect Data Loss, Suspect Long Flow	Trusted Internet Hosts	

Default Policies

Name	Description
Inside Hosts	All hosts in Inside Hosts
Outside Hosts	All hosts in Outside Hosts

Policies can be created for individual host groups

Tune alarm thresholds

Default policy for Inside and Outside hosts

Add... Duplicate... Remove Edit...

Edit...

Flow Query Basics – The Flow Table

Filter

Filter conditions

Filter Domain : ACME Time : Last 5 minutes

Client or Server Host Group : Inside Hosts

Table Short List

Flow Table - 2,000 records

Client Host	Client Host Groups	Server Host	Server Host Groups	Application	Service Summary	Duration
10.10.101.89	Desktops, Atlanta	4.27.11.253	United States	streaming audio/video	http (80/tcp)	4 hours 2 minutes 39s
10.10.1.31	Atlanta	10.10.99.21	Atlanta	NetFlow/sFlow	netflow (2055/udp)	3 hours 30 minutes 27s
10.10.101.43	Desktops, Atlanta	10.203.0.207	Atlanta, Engineer	HTTPS	https (443/tcp)	33 days 4 hours 4 minutes
10.10.101.23	Desktops, Atlanta	10.202.30.126	Atlanta, Engineer	HTTPS	https (443/tcp)	33 days 4 hours 4 minutes
10.10.31.48	Desktops, Atlanta	10.3.1.104	Atlanta, Engineer	SSH/SCP (unclassified)	ssh (22/tcp)	33 days 4 hours 4 minutes
10.10.101.159	Desktops, Atlanta	10.202.3.110	Atlanta, Engineer	HTTPS	https (443/tcp)	8 hours 14 minutes 45s
10.10.30.23	Domain Controllers, Atlanta	10.10.30.16	Domain Controllers, Atlanta, DNS Servers, NTP Servers	authentication	Undefined TCP (3268/tcp)	33 days 4 hours 5 minutes
10.10.30.23	Domain Controllers, Atlanta	10.10.30.16	Domain Controllers, Atlanta, DNS Servers, NTP Servers	authentication	ldap (389/tcp)	33 days 4 hours 4 minutes

Details

More details

Flow Query Basics - Filtering

Filter - Flow Table

Hosts

Filter by Host

Where the **Client or Server Host**

includes **the IP Address List:**

10.10.200.79

and excludes **None**

and the Other Host

includes **All**

and excludes **None**

Help OK Close

Select host to investigate

All flows in which this host was a client or server

Flow Query Basics - Filtering

All flows for 10.10.200.79 in the last hour

Filter Domain : ACME Time : Last 1 hour
 Client or Server Host : 10.10.200.79

Table Short List

Flow Table - 68 records

Client User Name	Client Host	Client Host Groups	Server Host	Server C...	Server Host Groups	Duration	Application
billy	10.10.200.79	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Trusted Wireless	10.10.32.24	RFC 1918	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Mail Servers	22 hours 50 minutes 25s	Undefined TCP
billy	10.10.200.79	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Trusted Wireless	10.10.32.24	RFC 1918	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Mail Servers	6 minutes 21s	HTTPS
billy	10.10.200.79	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Trusted Wireless	10.10.31.33	RFC 1918	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, File Servers	27s	HTTP
billy	10.10.200.79	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Trusted Wireless	10.10.30.12	RFC 1918	End User Devices, Domain Controllers, Atlanta, New York	1 minute 23s	HTTP
billy	10.10.200.79	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Trusted Wireless	38.109.139.142	United States	United States	1 minute 15s	HTTP
billy	10.10.200.79	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.1	RFC 1918	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Trusted Wireless	22 hours 50 minutes 55s	Undefined UDP
billy	10.10.200.79	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Trusted Wireless	10.10.30.12	RFC 1918	End User Devices, Domain Controllers, Atlanta, New York	9s	HTTP
billy	10.10.200.79	End User Devices, Atlanta, New York, Trusted Wireless	208-80-58-74.clickability.com (208.80.58.74)	United States	United States	1 minute 15s	HTTP

Flow Table: Visibility across NAT

Filter Domain : demo.local Time : From Sep 11, 2012 9:00:15 AM to Sep 11, 2012 9:20:15 AM
Cisco ASA : 192.168.200.6

Table Short List

Flow Table - 11 records

Client Host	Translated Host	Client User Name	Server Host	Service Summary	Server Host Groups
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States

User

Inside local

Outside global


Server

Querying Events - Leveraging NSEL

Flow Action	Client Host	Client Host Groups	Server Host	Server Host Groups	Service Summary
Denied	168.192.200.22	United States	192.168.203.10	Web Servers	Undefined TCP (90/tcp)
Denied	168.192.200.22	United States	192.168.203.10	Web Servers	Undefined TCP (900/tcp)
Denied	168.192.200.22	United States	192.168.203.10	Web Servers	Undefined TCP (648/tcp)
Denied	168.192.200.22	United States	192.168.203.10	Web Servers	Undefined TCP (720/tcp)
Denied	168.192.200.22	United States	192.168.203.10	Web Servers	Undefined TCP (100/tcp)
Denied	168.192.200.22	United States	192.168.203.10	Web Servers	Undefined TCP (1022/tcp)
Denied	168.192.200.22	United States	192.168.203.10	Web Servers	Undefined TCP (19/tcp)
Denied	168.192.200.22	United States	192.168.203.10	Web Servers	Undefined TCP (32/tcp)
Denied	168.192.200.22	United States	192.168.203.10	Web Servers	Undefined TCP (512/tcp)

Flow denied events over many ports

Flow Table – IPv6

Flow Table - 504 records 

Client Host	Client Host Groups	Server Host	Server Host Groups	Duration	Application
2000:1:4:0:204:23ff:fe9e:f16e	Atlanta IPv6	2000:1:1:0:213:72ff:fe56:20e9	Atlanta IPv6	4 minutes 58s	SSH/SCP (unclassified)
2000:1:4:0:204:23ff:fe9e:f16e	Atlanta IPv6	2000:1:1:0:213:72ff:fe56:20e9	Atlanta IPv6	6s	Undefined TCP
2000:1:4:0:204:23ff:fe9e:f16e	Atlanta IPv6	2000:1:1:0:213:72ff:fe56:20e9	Atlanta IPv6	6s	Undefined TCP
2000:1:1:0:213:72ff:fe56:20e9	Atlanta IPv6	2000:1:4:0:204:23ff:fe9e:f16e	Atlanta IPv6	50s	Undefined
2000:1:4:0:204:23ff:fe9e:f16e	Atlanta IPv6	2000:1:2:0:204:23ff:feb4:eb25	Atlanta IPv6	< 1s	HTTP (unclassified)
2000:1:4:0:204:23ff:fe9e:f16e	Atlanta IPv6	2000:1:1:0:213:72ff:fe56:20e9	Atlanta IPv6	4 minutes 58s	HTTP (unclassified)

Host Groups – Targeted Monitoring

Host Group Dashboard for Engineers

Filter: Domain : ACME
Host Group : Engineer

Network | **Security** | Alarm Summary

Active High Concern Hosts - 1 Record

Host	CI	CI%
10.202.1.122	584,942	62%

Suspiciously behaving hosts

Alarm Trend, Last 2 Weeks

Active Alarms, Today (Unacknowledg...)


Alarm	Source	Sour...	Target	Targe...	Details	Start Active ...
High Volume Email	10.202.1.223	Atlanta, Engineer	Multiple Hosts		Double-click for details.	Apr 25, 2013 5:25:00 PM (8 minutes 58s ago)
High Volume Email	10.202.1.65	Atlanta, Engineer	Multiple Hosts		Double-click for details.	Apr 25, 2013 5:00:00 PM (33 minutes 58s ago)

Active High Target Hosts - 4 recor...

Host	TI	TI%
10.202.3.110	62,710	84%
10.202.1.124	108,832	82%
10.202.3.112	138,770	76%
10.202.1.226	20,112	67%

Alarms

Host Groups – Application Report



Host Groups – Targeted Reporting


The screenshot displays a hierarchical tree of host groups. The 'Countries' folder is expanded to show 'Americas', which is further expanded to 'Northern America', and then to 'Canada'. A context menu is open over 'Canada', listing various options. A callout box points to the 'Canada' node, and another callout box points to the 'Flow Traffic' option in the menu.

Geo-IP-based Host Group

Summary chart of traffic inbound and outbound from this Host Group

- Host Group Dashboard
- Top
- Status
- Security
- Hosts
- Traffic
 - Host Group Application Traffic
 - Host Group Service Traffic
 - Host Group Traffic
 - Flow Traffic
- Reports
- Flows
- Configuration
- Expand All (Ctrl+Shift+E)
- Collapse All (Ctrl+Shift+C)
- Refresh Tree

Host Groups – Targeted Reporting



Traffic inbound

Traffic outbound

Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts


The screenshot shows the Cisco Prime Network Manager interface. On the left is a tree view of the network hierarchy. The 'Host Groups' folder is expanded, showing sub-folders like 'Inside Hosts' and 'Outside Hosts'. Under 'Inside Hosts', the 'Catch All' group is selected. A context menu is open over 'Catch All', listing various options. A callout box points to the 'Catch All' group with the text 'Catch All: All unclassified RFC1918 addresses'. Another callout box points to the 'Identity and Device Table' option in the context menu with the text 'Table of all individual hosts'.

Catch All: All unclassified RFC1918 addresses

Table of all individual hosts

- Host Group Dashboard
- Top
- Status
- Security
- Hosts**
 - Active Hosts
 - Host Information
 - Host Notes
 - Identity and Device Table**
 - Host Group Trends
- Traffic
- Reports
- Flows
- Configuration
- Expand All (Ctrl+Shift+E)
- Collapse All (Ctrl+Shift+C)
- Refresh Tree

Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts




Identity and Device Table x

Filter Domain : ACME
Host Group : Catch All


Identity and Device Table - 255 records

Start Active Time	End Active Time	User Name	Host	Host Groups	MAC Address	Device Type
Apr 27, 2013 6:17:41 PM (2 days 18 hours 28 minutes ago)	Current	isesim_user_7944	10.201.3.255	Catch All	f8:1e:df:57:0c:44 (Apple, Inc)	Apple-MacBook
Apr 27, 2013 6:17:41 PM (2 days 18 hours 28 minutes ago)	Current	isesim_user_1148	10.201.3.254	Catch All	f8:1e:df:13:c5:42 (Apple, Inc)	Apple-MacBook
Apr 27, 2013 6:17:41 PM (2 days 18 hours 28 minutes ago)	Current	isesim_user_8109	10.201.3.253	Catch All	f8:1e:df:63:20:4f (Apple, Inc)	Apple-MacBook
Apr 27, 2013 6:17:41 PM (2 days 18 hours 28 minutes ago)	Current	isesim_user_2386	10.201.3.252	Catch All	f8:1e:df:a2:33:4d (Apple, Inc)	Apple-MacBook
Apr 27, 2013 6:17:41 PM (2 days 18 hours 28 minutes ago)	Current	isesim_user_8686	10.201.3.251	Catch All	f8:1e:df:31:71:74 (Apple, Inc)	Apple-MacBook

Indicators of Compromise




Attack Lifecycle Model (AKA the Kill Chain)




Mandiant APT1 Report: http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf

Kill Chain: <http://bit.ly/killchain>

Building a Timeline



Identifying the Culprit



APT1

IOC: Mandiant publishes list of domain names and IP addresses known to be used by APT1

The screenshot shows the 'Host Group Editor for ACME' interface. On the left, a tree view shows various host categories, with 'APT1' selected under 'Outside Hosts'. A callout bubble points to this selection with the text 'Create a Host Group for APT1'. On the right, the 'Host Group' details are shown: 'Id: 61', 'Name: APT1', and a list of 'Ranges' containing ten IP addresses. A callout bubble points to this list with the text 'IP Addresses'.

Host Group
Id: 61
Name: APT1
Ranges
8.5.1.34
12.38.236.32
23.19.7.190
46.137.20.128
46.137.65.92
46.149.18.14
46.149.18.151
50.63.70.1
50.63.202.37

Create a Host Group for APT1

IP Addresses

APT1 – Host Locking Violation Alarm

Host Locking: Add Rule

Name: Communication to APT1

Description:

Client Host Group: Inside Hosts Browse...

Server Host Group: Outside Hosts -> APT1 Browse...

Disallow all traffic except
 Allow all traffic except

Services

- 0-hop
- 3pc
- a/n
- afs
- ah
- aol-im
- apple-net-assistant
- appleshare

Applications

- ActiveX
- Adobe Connect
- authentication
- Blackberry
- Citrix
- Clearcase
- corporate email
- DHCP

Unidirectional UDP traffic triggers alarm
 Unidirectional TCP traffic triggers alarm

Help OK Cancel

Create a Host Lock Violation Alarm for communication to APT1

Disallow all traffic

Trigger alarm on any unidirectional traffic

Set client hosts to all Inside Hosts

Set server hosts to APT1

APT1 - Investigate

You know today what you didn't know yesterday

Run a Flow Query

Over the last 90 days

Filter - Flow Table

Hosts

Filter by Host

Where the

includes

106.186.16.96
106.186.19.222
106.186.19.25
106.186.21.158

and excludes

and the Other Host

includes

and excludes

Help OK Cancel

Server or client includes the APT1 IP Address list

APT1 – Returned Flows

Infected hosts

FTP Transfers

Table Short List

Flow Table - 32 records

Client Host	Client Host Groups	Server Host	Server Host Groups	Duration	Application	Total Bytes
10.210.7.38	File Servers	li527-96.members.linode.com (106.186.16.96)	Japan	18 minutes 59s	FTP (unclassified)	1.16G
10.10.31.48	File Servers	161.58.93.33	United States	19 minutes 1s	FTP (unclassified)	1.16G
10.50.100.83	File Servers	161.58.182.205	United States	38s	FTP	2.2k

APT1 Servers

Investigating Malware Spread: Worm Tracker


Worm tracker

Secondary infections

Initial infection

Subnets being scanned

IOC: IDS Alert indicating a known worm operating inside your network



Investigating Malware Spread: Host Snapshot

Everything the system knows about 10.10.200.59

Start with CI Events. We notice significant scanning activity

Host is Source of CI Events - 22 records

Start Active Time	Last Active Time	Target Host Groups	Target Host	Concern I...	CI Events
Apr 15, 2013 12:55:37 AM (23 hours 54 minutes 19s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 9:55:46 PM (2 hours 54 minutes 10s ago)	Catch All	10.20.40.0/24	1,767,533	Addr_Scan/tcp-135(3533)
Apr 15, 2013 12:55:37 AM (23 hours 54 minutes 19s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 9:55:46 PM (2 hours 54 minutes 10s ago)	Catch All	10.20.10.0/24	1,620,254	Addr_Scan/tcp-135(3254)
Apr 15, 2013 12:55:37 AM (23 hours 54 minutes 19s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 9:55:46 PM (2 hours 54 minutes 10s ago)	Catch All	10.20.20.0/24	1,602,202	Addr_Scan/tcp-135(3202)
Apr 15, 2013 12:55:37 AM (23 hours 54 minutes 19s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 9:55:46 PM (2 hours 54 minutes 10s ago)	Catch All	10.20.70.0/24	1,596,186	Addr_Scan/tcp-135(3186)
Apr 15, 2013 7:39:59 AM (17 hours 9 minutes 57s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 6:58:18 PM (5 hours 51 minutes 38s ago)	Atlanta, File Servers	10.10.31.0/24	435,904	Ping_Scan(904)
Apr 15, 2013 7:44:19 AM (17 hours 5 minutes 37s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 7:00:49 PM (5 hours 49 minutes 7s ago)	Domain Controllers, Atlanta, DNS Servers, NTP Servers	10.10.30.0/24	252,514	Addr_Scan/tcp-27001(6), Addr_Scan/tcp-27009(168), Ping_Scan(340)
Apr 15, 2013 7:44:26 AM (17 hours 5 minutes 30s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 6:58:42 PM (5 hours 51 minutes 14s ago)	Domain Controllers, Atlanta, NTP Servers	10.10.30.19	150,704	Reset/tcp-27000(24), Reset/tcp-27001(1100), Reset/tcp-27002(1091), Reset/tcp-27003(1086), Reset/tcp-27004(1200),

Investigating Malware Spread: Identity

Telemetry from the ISE

Host : 10.10.200.59

Identification | Alarms | Security | CI Events | Top Active Flows | **Identity, DHCP & Host Notes** | Exporter Interfaces

Identity and Device Table - 1 record

Start Active Time	End Active Time	User Name	MAC Address	Device Type	Domain Name	Network ...	Netwo...	Securi...
Jun 10, 2013 11:27:37 PM (8 days 20 hours 26 minutes ago)	Current	bmcMahon	00:d0:b8:0d:fd:27 (Iomega Corporation)	Windows7-Workst ation	LC	Unknown Exporter (10.10.1.1)	GigabitEthe rnet5/37	

Username

Infected machine

Investigating Malware Spread: Touched Hosts

This infected host has established a connection with another host

Touch Information - 1 record		
Appliance	Has Been Touched	Has Touched Another
pod99-fc-01 (10.11.99.20)	✓ No	! Yes

Quick View This Row
Hosts Touched By

Investigating Malware Spread: Touched Hosts

All hosts touched by 10.10.200.59

Filter Domain : ACME Time : April 15, 2013
High CI Host : 10.10.200.59

Summary - 57 records summarized into 14 records

Start Date/Time	End Date/Time	High CI Host Groups	High CI Host	Touched Host Groups	Touched Host
Apr 15, 2013 12:53:21 PM (11 hours 58 minutes 40s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 10:07:36 PM (2 hours 44 minutes 25s ago)	Atlanta, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.59	Domain Controllers, Atlanta, DNS Servers, NTP Servers	10.10.30.17
Apr 15, 2013 9:49:26 AM (15 hours 2 minutes 35s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 9:57:19 PM (2 hours 54 minutes 42s ago)	Atlanta, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.59	Atlanta, File Servers	10.10.31.33
Apr 15, 2013 9:40:04 AM (15 hours 11 minutes 57s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 7:08:28 PM (5 hours 43 minutes 33s ago)	Atlanta, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.59	Domain Controllers, Atlanta, DNS Servers, NTP Servers	10.10.30.15
Apr 15, 2013 12:53:32 PM (11 hours 58 minutes 29s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 7:02:39 PM (5 hours 49 minutes 22s ago)	Atlanta, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.59	Domain Controllers, Atlanta, DNS Servers, NTP Servers	10.10.30.16
Apr 15, 2013 12:59:26 PM (11 hours 52 minutes 35s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 6:59:56 PM (5 hours 52 minutes 5s ago)	Atlanta, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.59	Atlanta, File Servers	10.10.31.48
Apr 15, 2013 3:57:55 PM (8 hours 54 minutes 6s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 6:58:29 PM (5 hours 53 minutes 32s ago)	Atlanta, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.59	Atlanta, File Servers	10.10.31.46
Apr 15, 2013 6:55:46 PM (5 hours 56 minutes 15s ago)	Apr 15, 2013 6:55:46 PM (5 hours 56 minutes 15s ago)	Atlanta, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.59	Catch All	10.20.10.254






High Concern Index

Baseline deviated by 2,432%!

Concern Index x

Filter Domain : ACME Time : Today

Summary - 92 records summarized into 92 records

Host Groups	Host	CI	CI%	Alarms	Alerts
New York, Desktops	10.50.100.83	243,231,761	2,432% 		Ping, Rejects, TCP_Scan
Desktops, Atlanta	10.10.101.27	153,644,484	1,536% 	High Concern Index	Ping, Ping_Scan
Desktops, Atlanta	10.10.101.24	117,213,499	1,172% 		Ping, Ping_Scan, Rejects, TCP_Scan
Domain Controllers, Atlanta	10.10.30.28	32,760,657	328% 		High_Volume_Email, Ping, Ping_Scan, Rejects, TCP_Scan, UDP_Scan
Atlanta, Trusted Wireless	10.10.200.59	21,345,906	213% 		Ping, Ping_Scan, Port_Scan, Rejects, TCP_Scan, TCP_Stealth

What was this Host up to?

Target – entire subnet?

Filter Domain : ACME Time : Today
Host : 10.50.100.83


Identification Alarms Security **CI Events** Top Active Flows ... DHCP & Host Notes Exporter Interfaces

Host is Source of CI Events (High CI) - 25 records


Start Active Time	Last Active Time	Target Host Groups	Target Host	Concer... ¹	CI Events
Apr 17, 2013 12:39:57 AM (22 hours 7 minutes 4s ago)	Apr 17, 2013 10:40:06 PM (6 minutes 55s ago)	Atlanta, Engineer	10.202.2.0/24	5,765,795	Addr_Scan/tcp-445(11795)
Apr 17, 2013 12:39:57 AM (22 hours 7 minutes 4s ago)	Apr 17, 2013 10:40:06 PM (6 minutes 55s ago)	Atlanta, Engineer	10.202.1.0/24	5,600,479	Addr_Scan/tcp-445(11479)
Apr 17, 2013 12:39:57 AM (22 hours 7 minutes 4s ago)	Apr 17, 2013 10:40:06 PM (6 minutes 55s ago)	Atlanta, Engineer	10.202.3.0/24	5,591,328	Addr_Scan/tcp-445(11328)
Apr 17, 2013 12:39:57 AM (22 hours 7 minutes 4s ago)	Apr 17, 2013 10:40:06 PM (6 minutes 55s ago)	Atlanta, Engineer	10.202.0.0/24	5,576,380	Addr_Scan/tcp-445(11380)
Apr 17, 2013 12:39:57 AM (22 hours 7 minutes 4s ago)	Apr 17, 2013 10:40:06 PM (6 minutes 55s ago)	Atlanta, Engineer	10.202.6.0/24	5,534,438	Addr_Scan/tcp-445(11438)

Scanning on TCP-445

NetFlow and (D)DoS Detection



Volumetric DDoS



Identifying a DDoS Participant

IOC: Notification from 3rd party that your IP Address is participating in a DDoS

Filter - Flow Table

Hosts

Filter by Host

Where the **Client Host** includes the IP Address List:
168.192.203.101

and excludes None

and the **Server Host** includes the IP Address List:
168.192.200.22

and excludes None

Help OK Cancel

Time of reported attack

Public IP address

Target server

Identifying a DDoS Participant

Time of reported attack

Validate attack activity

User

Inside local

Outside global

Target Server

Filter Domain : demo.local Time : From Sep 11, 2012 9:00:15 AM to Sep 11, 2012 9:20:15 AM Cisco ASA : 192.168.200.6

Table Short List

Flow Table - 11 records

Client Host	Translated Host	Client User Name	Server Host	Service Summary	Server Host Groups
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States
192.168.201.100	168.192.203.101	billy	168.192.200.22	http (80/tcp)	United States

Identify a DDoS Participant

Host snapshot

✓ 192.168.201.100 ✕

Filter Domain : demo.local Time : Today
Host : 192.168.201.100


Identification Alarms Security **CI Events** Top Active Flows Identity, DHCP & Host Notes Exporter Interfaces

Host is Source of CI Events (High CI) - 2 records

Start Active Time	Last Active Time	Target Host Groups	Target Host	Concer... ¹	CI Events
Sep 11, 2012 3:40:07 AM (7 hours 10 minutes 32s ago)	Sep 11, 2012 3:44:41 AM (7 hours 5 minutes 58s ago)	United States	65.197.197.0/24	15,066	Addr_Scan/tcp-80(66)
Sep 10, 2012 10:22:36 PM (12 hours 28 minutes 3s ago)	Sep 11, 2012 8:46:20 AM (2 hours 4 minutes 19s ago)	Catch All	192.168.200.10	6	ICMP_Port_Unreach(3)

Other suspicious activity

Agenda



Links and Recommended Reading

More about the Cisco Cyber Threat Defence Solution:

<http://www.cisco.com/go/threatdefense>

<http://www.lancope.com>

Recommended Reading

Cyber Threat Defence Cisco Validated Design Guide:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns1015/ns1238/cyber_threat_defense_design_guide.pdf

Key Takeaways

Modern threats are consistently bypassing the security perimeter

Threat Detection requires visibility and context into network traffic



NetFlow and the Lancope StealthWatch System provide actionable security intelligence



Q & A

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