

*TOMORROW starts here.*



Cisco *live!*

# Security and Virtualisation in the Data Centre

BRKSEC-2205

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CCIE #19084



# Abstract

BRKSEC-2205

*The evolving complexity of the data centre is placing increased demand on the network and security teams to come up with inventive methods for enforcing security policies in these ever-changing environments. The goal of this session is to provide participants with an understanding of features and design recommendations for integrating security into the data centre environment.*

*This session will focus on recommendations for securing next-generation data centre architectures. Areas of focus include security services integration, leveraging device virtualisation, and considerations and recommendations for server virtualisation.*

*The target audience are security and data centre administrators.*

*Related sessions are BRKSEC-2009 "Securing Cloud Computing" and TECSEC-2670 "Data Centre Security"*


# Session Objectives

- Discuss common virtualisation security concerns
- Gain an understanding on aligning physical and virtual network security resources
- Focus on tools available to unify policy enforcement for the virtual environment
- How to Increase overall visibility for virtual machine traffic flows
- Understand how security services can be integrated into the Application Centric Infrastructure



# Security and Virtualisation in the Data Centre

## Agenda



▶ Virtualisation Trends, Priorities, Concerns

▶ Virtual Network Security Services

▶ Physical Network Security Services for Virtualisation


▶ Threat Identification and Correlation

▶ Application Centric Infrastructure Security

▶ Summary


# Data Centre Architecture

- Physical Network Fabric and Virtualisation
- DMZ network (physical or virtual workload) on DC edge that could securely leverage physical workloads or virtual workloads
- DC Core is Routed
- DC Aggregation layer contains Physical Security Services allowing the creation of internal zones / trust enclaves without crossing core (East-West) and crossing core (North-South) only when required
- Various End-of-Row/Top-of-Rack options represented between Aggregation and Compute/Access Layer
- Virtual Network and Security Services



# Building an Efficient DC Fabric to Scale

## Starting Point – The Compute Workload Domain




- Architectural Goal is balanced between the need to scale the application workload capabilities and provide availability and manageability of the network fabric
- Improving the efficiency of the Data Centre requires a more scalable and flexible network fabric design



# Server Virtualisation


- Single physical server hosting multiple **independent** guest OS and applications
- Hypervisor **abstracts** physical hardware from guest OS and applications
- Partitions system resources: CPU, Memory, Disk, Network
- Application & OS encapsulated as virtual machine



# Common Virtualisation Concerns

## Policy, Workflow, Operations


- Unified Policy Enforcement
  - Applied at physical server—not the individual VM
  - Impossible to enforce policy for VMs in motion
- Operations and Management
  - Lack of VM visibility, accountability, and consistency
  - Difficult management model and inability to effectively troubleshoot
- Roles and Responsibilities
  - Muddled ownership as server admin must configure virtual network
  - Organisational redundancy creates compliance challenges
- Machine and Application Segmentation
  - Server and application isolation on same physical server
  - No separation between compliant and non-compliant systems...



# Virtualisation Security

## Virtualisation Attention Deficit Disorder

- Collateral hacking?
- Segmentation?
- Side channel attacks?
- Visibility?
- Threat identification and defence?
- What about Hypervisor Hyperjacking?





# Simple, Effective, Achievable



## Segmentation

- **Establish boundaries:** network, compute, virtual
- **Enforce policy** by functions, devices, organisations, compliance
- **Control and prevent unauthorised access** to networks, resources, applications



## Threat Defence

- **Stop** internal and external **attacks and interruption of services**
- **Patrol** zone and edge **boundaries**
- **Control information** access and usage, prevent data loss and data modification



## Visibility

- Provide **transparency** to usage
- Apply **business context** to network activity
- **Simplify** operations and compliance reporting

**Defend,  
Detect,  
Control**


N ↔ S



E ↔ W

# Centralised or Decentralised Firewalls or Both?

- Centralised firewalls are the traditional approach
- Often a transitional architecture
- Firewalls in the core, aggregation or edge?
- Big challenge is scalability
- Usually the limiting factor is connections not bandwidth
- How to handle a requirement for L2 separation of hosts?
- How to address virtual host mobility?





## Virtual Network & Security Services




# Managing Virtual Networking Policy

Virtual Switches: Example Nexus 1000V

## Nexus 1000V

- Non-disruptive operational model to maintain current workflows using Port Profiles
- Maintain network security policies with isolation and segmentation via VLANs, Private VLANs, Port-based Access Lists, Cisco Integrated Security Features
- Ensure visibility (VM Introspection) into virtual machine traffic flows using traditional network features such as ERSPAN and NetFlow



# Port Profiles


Port Profile → Port Group

vCenter API


port-profile vm180  
 vmware port-group pg180  
 switchport mode access  
 switchport access vlan 180  
 ip flow monitor ESE-flow input  
 ip flow monitor ESE-flow output  
 no shutdown  
 state enabled

interface Vethernet9  
 inherit port-profile vm180


interface Vethernet10  
 inherit port-profile vm180



Network




Security



The screenshot shows the 'uber3 - Virtual Machine Properties' dialog. The 'Hardware' tab is active, showing a list of devices including Memory (1024 MB), CPU (1), Video card, VMCI device, Floppy drive 1, CD/DVD Drive 1, Network adapter 1 (FLASH), Network adapter 2 (pg180 (dcvsm), Port: 12), SCSI controller 1, and Hard disk 1. The 'Network Connection' section is expanded, showing 'Network Label' with a dropdown menu containing 'FLASH', 'FLASH', 'pg180 (dcvsm)', 'pgVM15 (dcvsm)', and 'erspan (dcvsm)'. The 'pg180 (dcvsm)' option is selected. Below the dropdown, there are fields for 'DVSwitch:' and 'Port ID:'.

Nexus 1000V supports:

- ✓ ACLs
- ✓ Quality of Service (QoS)
- ✓ PVLANS
- ✓ Port channels
- ✓ SPAN ports



# Nexus 1000V Security Features

## Laying the Foundation

### Switching

- L2 Switching, 802.1Q Tagging, **VLAN Segmentation**, Rate Limiting (TX)
- IGMP Snooping, QoS Marking (COS & DSCP)

### Security

- **Virtual Service Domain**, **Private VLANs w/ local PVLAN Enforcement**
- **Access Control Lists (L2–4 w/ Redirect)**, **Port Security**
- **Dynamic ARP Inspection**, **IP Source Guard**, **DHCP Snooping**

### Provisioning

- Automated vSwitch Config, **Port Profiles**, Virtual Centre Integration
- Optimised NIC Teaming with Virtual Port Channel – Host Mode

### Visibility

- VMotion Tracking, **ERSPAN**, **NetFlow v.9**, CDP v.2
- VM-Level Interface Statistics

### Management

- **Virtual Centre VM Provisioning**, Cisco Network Provisioning, CiscoWorks
- Cisco CLI, Radius, TACACs, Syslog, SNMP (v.1, 2, 3)



# Virtualised Network Services

## Nexus 1100 Platform

### Virtual Services Supported

N1KV VSM (vSphere)



Virtual Security Gateway (VSG)



Network Analysis Module (NAM)



DC Network Manager (DCNM)



### Virtual Services

N1KV VSM (Xen, Hyper-V, KVM)



VXLAN Gateway

ASAv, vWAAS, CSR

Netscaler VPX


Imperva Web App FW

Note: Any Virtual Service can be solely deployed on N1100 series.

# vPath Enables Chaining of Network Services


vPath is Nexus 1000V data plane component:

- Topology agnostic service insertion model
- Service Chaining across multiple virtual services
- Performance acceleration with vPath e.g. VSG flow offload
- Efficient and Scalable Architecture
- Non- Disruptive Operational Model
- VM Policy mobility with VM mobility




# Cisco's **vPath** Virtual Firewalls: VSG and ASA1000V

- Cisco has two virtual firewalls: the ASA 1000V and the Virtual Security Gateway (VSG)
- Each runs as a virtual machine in VMWare or Hyper-V
- Both are managed via Virtual Network Management Centre (VNMC) / Prime Network Services Controller (PNSC)
- Both are licensed per CPU socket
- They are complementary to each other, require the Nexus 1000V Virtual Distributed Switch and utilise a new forwarding plane, **vPath**



Virtual Security Gateway



ASA 1000V



# vPath Service Chaining

- ASA 1000V and VSG
  - **vservice node ASA1 type asa**
    - ip address 172.31.2.11
    - adjacency I2 vlan 3770
  - **vservice node VSG1 type vsg**
    - ip address 10.10.11.202
    - adjacency I3
  - **vservice path chain-VSG-ASA**
    - node VSG1 profile sp-web order 10
    - node ASA1 profile sp-edge order 20
  - **port-profile type vethernet Tenant-1**
    - org root/Tenant-1
    - vservice path chain-VSG-ASA




Defining the Service Node on Nexus 1000V

Chain the Service Nodes  
Order is inside to outside

Enable the Service Chain Per Port-Profile

# What is the Virtual Security Gateway?

- VSG is a L2 firewall that runs as a virtual machine “bump in the wire”
- Similar to L2 transparent FW mode of ASA
- It provides stateful inspection between L2 adjacent hosts (same subnet or VLAN)
- It can use VMware attributes for policy
- Provides benefits of L2 separation for East-West traffic flows
- One or more VSGs are deployed per tenant



# VSG Attributes

## vCenter VM Attributes

Name	Meaning	Source
vm.name	Name of this VM	vCenter
vm.host-name	Name of this ESX-host	vCenter
vm.os-fullname	Name of guest OS	vCenter
vm.vapp-name	Name of the associated vApp	vCenter
vm.cluster-name	Name of the cluster	vCenter
vm.portprofile-name	Name of the port-profile	Port-profile

VM attribute information collected is used for enforcing security policy


## Security Policy Profile

- Defined/Managed by VNMC / Prime NSC
- Bound to Cisco Nexus 1000V VSM port-profile



# The ASA 1000V Cloud Firewall

- ASA 1000V is a software-only version of an ASA appliance—an edge firewall with **limited features**
- Runs ASA codebase in a virtual machine in L3 mode only
- Supports S2S IPSEC VPN (not RA VPN)
- Can be deployed in active/standby HA
- Management via ASDM or VNMC/PNSC but not both
- Not a replacement for physical appliance!



4 interfaces: inside, outside, failover and management

# Virtual Network Security Policy Engine

VNMC


The screenshot displays the Cisco VNMC interface, divided into several sections:

- Top Navigation:** Tenant Management | Resource Management | Policy Management | Administration
- Left Panel (Managed Resources):** Shows a tree view under 'Firewalls' with categories like Compute Firewalls (VSG-1, VSG-2), Edge Firewalls (ASA1000V-1), Pools (default), and two tenants (Tenant-1, Tenant2), each with its own set of Compute Firewalls, Edge Firewalls, Pools, and DCs.
- Center Panel (root):** Shows the configuration for the 'root' object. It includes tabs for General, Sub-Elements, Faults, and Events. Under 'Properties', it lists 'Name: root' and 'Description:'.
- Right Panel (Security Policies):** Shows a tree view of security policies. The 'Policies' folder is expanded, showing a list of policy types: ACL, ACL Policy Sets, NAT, NAT Policy Sets, Packet Inspection, TCP Intercept, VPN (IPSec Policies, Crypto Map Policies, Interface Policy Sets, IKE Policies, Peer Auth Policies, VPN Device Policies).

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# Virtual Services Architecture

Provides a Framework for Building Virtual Network Services



## Virtual Network Management Centre (VNMCC)

**Centralised Management Plane - VM Policy Management (PIP and PAP)**  
**Multi-Device Management**  
**vCenter Integration – VM Attributes**  
**North Bound XML API**  
**Multi-Tenant**

## Virtual Service Node (VSN)

**Distributed Service Plane - VM Service Processing**  
**VSNs – VSG, vWAAS, ASA1000V..**  
**Multi-Instance**

## vPath


**Distributed Data Plane - Embedded in VEM**  
**vPath API – re-usable for multiple services**  
**Multi-Tenant**



# Policy Workflow

Server, Network, Security

- Mitigate Operational errors between teams
- Security team defines security policies
- Networking team binds port-profile to VSG service profile
- Server team Assigns VMs to Nexus 1000V port-profiles



# Introducing the Virtualised ASA (ASAv)



- **Scheduled release spring 2014**
- Developed due to customer feedback for a complete ASA firewall running as a virtual machine
- Nexus1000V not required
- Will support VMWare first then other hypervisors
- ASA feature parity (with some exceptions)
- No support for:
  1. ASA clustering
  2. Multi context mode
  3. Etherchannel interfaces
  4. Active/Active Failover (requires multi context mode)



ASAv Firewall  
(Virtualised ASA)

# ASAv Deployment: Cloud Security FW+VPN

- Today multi context mode on ASA is used to provide firewall inspection for multi tenant and multi zone environments
- Trunks are typically used to transport zone and tenant traffic
- Challenge of E-W scale requires more firewall resources and scalable solution



- ASAv provides edge firewall and can scale for E-W buildout
- Each tenant or zone gets one or more ASAv for FW + VPN
- Scaled VPN termination for S2S and RA VPN clients




# Comparing Cisco Virtual Firewalls

ASAv	ASA1000V (Edge)	Virtual Security Gateway
L2 and L3 mode	L3 routed mode only	L2 mode (transparent)
Dyn and static routing	Static routes only	No routing
DHCP server and client support	DHCP server and client support	No DHCP support
S2S and RA VPN	Supports site-to-site IPSEC	No IPSEC support
Managed via CLI, ASDM, CSM	Managed by ASDM and VNMC/PNSC	Managed by VNMC/PNSC only
Full ASA code, CLI, SSH, REST API	Uses ASA code, CLI, SSH	Minimal config via CLI, SSH

# Cisco Prime Network Services Controller (PNSC)

Version 3.2

- Added feature support:
  1. Citrix NetScaler VPX/1000v
  2. CSR 1000v
  3. Dynamic Fabric Automation (DFA) Service Insertion
  4. Cisco Intelligent Automation for Cloud (IAC) integration








# Virtual IPS



# vIPS

## Virtual Switch Inline and Passive Deployment Options




# FireSIGHT Context Explorer


Application Security and Visibility




View all application traffic...




Look for risky applications...





Who is using them?



What else have these users been up to?



On what operating systems?




# Application Security & Visibility


## Geo Location Information

### Geolocation Information


Connections by Initiator Country



Intrusion Events by Source Country




File Events by Sending Country




### URL Information


Traffic by URL



Traffic by URL Category



Traffic by URL Reputation






## Deployment Example



# Layer 2 Segmentation

## PVLANS for VM Isolation


- VMs in same Layer 2 subnet can be isolated
- Only allowed to communicate outbound to Layer 3 gateway
- Use ACL on gateway to block source and destination IPs from PVLANS



# VM Visibility

## NetFlow for VM Network Behaviour Analysis


- VMs flows can be mirrored via span port on virtual switch. Can also use ERSPAN to forward via Layer 3 (ex. 6500 NAM module).
- VM flow analysis for trending, visibility, and security



# Application Security & Visibility

## ASAv


- Stateful inspection with virtual ASA for north-south, east-west VM traffic
- Transparent or routed mode
- Service Elasticity



# Application Security & Visibility


## vIPS

- Stateful inspection with virtual ASA and vIPS for north-south, east-west VM traffic
- Deep inspection with vIPS – inline with VLAN pairing via Nexus 1000v (promiscuous port on vswitch)





# Virtualised DMZ






# Physical Security Services for Virtualisation

# What is TrustSec?

## Tagging Data for Security Policy Control is Unique to TrustSec



Users and Systems are **Classified** into Security Groups based on Context. Traffic is then Tagged with the Security Group ID


- Tags can be applied to individual users, servers, networks or network connection traffic
- Forwarding, filtering, inspection and other decisions can be based upon TrustSec Tags
- Provides virtual network segmentation, flexible access control and FW rule automation

# Why TrustSec ?

- Simplifies Security Policies, Access Control & Segmentation
- Automates Cisco FW rule admin in Cisco DC & network environments
- Leverage your switching and routing infrastructure for Security
- Distributed Enforcement with Massive Scale.
- Consistent Segmentation for Physical and Virtual Workloads
  - Nexus 1000v – Static SGT Mapping (IP, Port Profile) & SXP
- Separation of Duties: Server, Network and Security Admin.



# How is the SGT Shared?



- **Inline Tagging (data plane):** If Device supports SGT in its ASIC
- **SXP (control plane):** Shared between devices that do not have SGT-capable hardware

# More on TrustSec Architecture




- TECSEC-2760 – Data Centre Security
- BRKSEC-2690 - Deploying Security Group Tags
- BRKSEC-2663 - Before. During. After. Cisco's Integrated Security Strategy

# ASA Firewalls and the Data Centre Fabric

## Data Centre Aggregation Layer

- ASA and Nexus Virtual Port Channel
  - vPC ensures all active links utilised (eliminates blocked STP links)
  - Unique integration with ASA and Nexus (LACP)
- IPS module relies on ASA connectivity –provides DPI
- Validated design to provide segmentation, threat protection, visibility
- Note that vPC identifiers are **different** for each ASA (\*changes with clustering feature)
- Transparent (recommended) and static routed modes
- Works with both A/S and A/A failover








# Transparent Mode Configuration in the DC

## Two Interfaces

```
interface
TenGigabitEthernet0/6
channel-group 32 mode
active vss-id 1
no nameif
no security-level
!
interface
TenGigabitEthernet0/7
channel-group 32 mode
active vss-id 2
no nameif
no security-level
!
```


```
interface BVI1
ip address 172.16.25.86
255.255.255.0
!
interface Port-channel32
no nameif
no security-level
!
interface Port-channel32.201
mac-address 3232.1111.3232
vlan 201
nameif inside
bridge-group 1
security-level 100
!
interface Port-channel32.200
mac-address 3232.1a1a.3232
vlan 200
nameif outside
bridge-group 1
security-level 0
```



# Physical to Virtual


- Leverage physical to provide isolation and segmentation for virtual
- Zones used define policy enforcement
- Physical Infrastructure mapped per zone

- Separate and dedicated routing tables per zone via VRF
- Firewall enforcement per zone maps north-south, east-west
- Layer 2 and Layer 3 path through physical services



# Firewall & Virtual Environment


## ASA Virtual Contexts for Inter-Zone VM Traffic Flows



# Inspecting Inter-VLAN VM Traffic Flows

```


interface TenGigabitEthernet0/6
channel-group 32 mode active vss-id 1
no nameif
no security-level
!
interface TenGigabitEthernet0/7
channel-group 32 mode active vss-id 2
no nameif
no security-level
!
interface BV1
ip address 10.10.101.254 255.255.255.0
!
interface Port-channel32
no nameif
no security-level
!
interface Port-channel32.20
mac-address 3232.1111.3232
vlan 20
nameif inside
bridge-group 1
security-level 100
!
interface Port-channel32.21
mac-address 3232.1a1a.3232
vlan 21
nameif outside
bridge-group 1
security-level 0
...
    
```





# Firewall Clustering

## ASA Clustering to meet DC Requirements




# Physical to Virtual

## Segmentation VRF-VLAN-Virtual

- Merging physical and virtual infrastructure
- Zones used define policy enforcement
- Unique policies and traffic decisions applied to each zone
- Physical Infrastructure mapped per zone
  - VRF, Nexus Virtual Device Context, VLANs, SGT

### Segmentation Building Blocks





## Enhanced Visibility and Threat Defence for the Data Centre




# NetFlow Security Use Cases

- **Detecting Sophisticated and Persistent Threats.** Malware that makes it past perimeter security can remain in the enterprise waiting to strike as lurking threats. These may be zero day threats.
- **Identifying BotNet Command & Control Activity.** BotNets are implanted in the enterprise to execute commands from their Bot herders to send SPAM, Denial of Service attacks, or other malicious acts.
- **Uncovering Network Reconnaissance.** Some attacks will probe the network looking for attack vectors to be utilised by custom-crafted cyber threats.
- **Finding Internally Spread Malware.** Network interior malware proliferation can occur across hosts for the purpose gathering security reconnaissance data, data exfiltration or network backdoors
- **Revealing Data Loss.** Code can be hidden in the enterprise to export of sensitive information back to the attacker. This Data Leakage may occur rapidly or over time.







# NetFlow in a Nutshell



# Cyber Threat Defence Solution Components



# Cyber Threat Defence Solution



# Cisco CTD Solution

## Attack Detection without Signatures

High **Concern Index** indicates a significant number of suspicious events that deviate from established baselines

Summary - 84 records summarized into 84 records

Host Groups	Host	CI	CI%	Alarms	Alerts
Atlanta, Desktops	10.10.101.118	865,645,669	8,656%	High Concern Index	Ping, Ping_Scan, TCP_Scan
Atlanta, Desktops	10.10.101.27	315,014,634	3,150%	High Concern Index, High Total Traffic	Ping, Ping_Scan
Desktops, New York	10.50.100.83	180,149,569	1,801%	High File Sharing Index, High Total Traffic	Ping, Ping_Scan, Rejects, TCP_Scan

Host Groups	Host	CI	CI%	Alarms	Alerts
Hosts	10.10.101.118	338,137,280	112,712%	High Concern index	Ping, Ping_Scan, TCP_Scan
Catch All	10.40.10.254	12,063,078	121%		TCP_Scan

Monitor and baseline activity for a host and within host groups.



# Identify Threats and Assign Attribution

Leveraging an Integration between Cisco ISE and Lancope StealthWatch


Alarm Table - 35 records

Policy	Start Active Time	Alarm	Source	Source Host Group	Source User	Target
Inside Hosts	8-Feb-2012 5:05:00 PM (5 days 2 hours 23 minutes ago)	Suspect Data Loss	10.34.74.123	SJCM, Wired Data		Multiple Hosts
Inside Hosts	7-Feb-2012 8:50:00 PM	Suspect Data Loss	10.33.25.248	SJC18, Wired Data		Multiple Hosts

Policy	Start Active Time	Alarm	Source	Source Host Group	Source User Name	Target
Inside Hosts	8-Feb-2012	Suspect Data Loss	10.34.74.123	Wired Data	Bob	Multiple Hosts

48 minutes ago)

# Detecting Internally Spreading Malware



# Detecting Internally Spreading Malware

IP Address

Alarm indicating this host touched another host which then began exhibiting the same suspicious behaviour

Suspicious activity that triggered the alarm

Filter Domain : Time : February 1, 2012  
Host : 10.40.10.254

Identification Alarms Security CI Events Top Active Flows Identity, DHCP & Host Notes Exporter Interface


Alarm Counts - 1 record

Appliance	Critical	Major
FlowCollector01 (10.192.0.192)		5(0)

Alarms - 21 records

Start Active Time	Alarm	Source	Details
Feb 1, 2012 8:39:30 PM (12 days 19 hours 27 minutes ago)	Worm Propagation	10.40.10.254	Worm propagated from Source Host using ms-rpc (135/tcp) (Double-click for details)
Feb 1, 2012 7:40:00 PM (12 days 20 hours 26 minutes ago)	New Flows Initiated	10.40.10.254	Observed 1.07k flows. Policy maximum allows up to 1k flows.
Feb 1, 2012 7:39:30 PM (12 days 20 hours 27 minutes ago)	Worm Propagation	10.40.10.254	Worm propagated from Source Host using ms-rpc (135/tcp) (Double-click for details)
Feb 1, 2012 6:40:00 PM (12 days 21 hours 26 minutes ago)	New Flows Initiated	10.40.10.254	Observed 1.12k flows. Policy maximum allows up to 1k flows.
Feb 1, 2012 6:39:30 PM (12 days 21 hours 27 minutes ago)	Worm Propagation	10.40.10.254	Worm propagated from Source Host using ms-rpc (135/tcp) (Double-click for details)
Feb 1, 2012 5:40:00 PM (12 days 22 hours 26 minutes ago)	New Flows Initiated	10.40.10.254	Observed 1.04k flows. Policy maximum allows up to 1k flows.

# Infection Tracking



Initial Infection


Secondary Infection

Tertiary Infection



# Summary

## Leverages Cisco Network for Security Telemetry




NetFlow-enabled Cisco switches and routers become security telemetry sources  
Cisco is the undisputed market leader in **Hardware-enabled NetFlow devices**

## Provides Rich Context



Unites NetFlow data with identity and application ID to provide security context



## Provides Threat Visibility and Context



Single pane of glass that unifies threat detection, visibility, forensics analysis, and reporting




# ACI Security Overview


# Traditional Data Centre to Application-Centric Infrastructure Security (ACIS)

Today

0  
Current: Traditional Nexus 7K Data Centre  
- Data Centre technologies that we sell today – CY14  
- Addition of Virtual ASA in hypervisor for both East-West and North-South use-cases – Mar/Apr 2014



Tomorrow



# ACI Introduces Logical Network Provisioning of Stateless Hardware

## Flat Hardware Accelerated Network


Full abstraction, de-coupled from VLANs and Dynamic Routing, low latency, built-in QoS

## Flexible Insertion

Every device is one hop away, microsecond latency, no power or port availability constraints, ease of scaling

## Unified Management and Visibility

ACI Controller manages all participating devices, change control and audit capabilities



## Flexible Programmability

XML/JSON for Northbound API  
Python scripting for custom device management

ACI Spine Nodes

ACI Leaf Nodes

## Fabric Port Services

Hardware filtering and bridging; seamless service insertion, "service farm" aggregation

## Logical Endpoint Groups by Role

Heterogeneous clients, servers, external clouds; fabric controls communication






# ACI Fabric Policy

# Application Policy Model and Instantiation

Application policy model: Defines the application requirements (application network profile)



Policy instantiation: Each device dynamically instantiates the required changes based on the policies




All forwarding in the fabric is managed through the application network profile

- IP addresses are fully portable **anywhere** within the fabric
- Security and forwarding are fully **decoupled** from any physical or virtual network attributes
- Devices autonomously update the state of the network based on configured policy requirements

*What should be allowed to communicate*  
*What should not be allowed to communicate*  
*What should use an application service (Firewall, ADC)*  
*What should have QoS, redirect, ..., policies applied*


# ACI Policy Model

Formalised Description of Connectivity



End-Point Groups (EPGs) are a grouping of end-points representing applications or application components independent of other network constructs.

# Building Contracts



Subjects are a combination of a filter, an action and a label

Contracts define communication between source and destination EPGs




Contracts are groups of subjects which define communication between EPGs.




# Policy Options: Actions

- There are six policy options supported:
- Permit the traffic
- Block the traffic
- Redirect the traffic
- Log the traffic
- Copy the traffic
- Mark the traffic (DSCP/CoS)



Policy encompasses traffic handling, quality of service, security monitoring and logging.

# Inter-EPG Communication Example






## Service Insertion

# ACI Layer 4 - 7 Service Integration

## Centralised, Automated, and Supports Existing Model

- Elastic service insertion architecture for physical and virtual services
- Helps enable administrative separation between application tier policy and service definition
- APIC as central point of network control with policy coordination
- Automation of service bring-up / tear-down through programmable interface
- Supports existing operational model when integrated with existing services
- Service enforcement guaranteed, regardless of endpoint location






# Device Package


- Defines services appliances
- Lists service functions offered by the services appliance
- Provides scripts for driving service configuration
- Plan is to open the API so that anyone can create a device package and have a community similar to Puppet manifests or Chef recipes

## SERVICE AUTOMATION ARCHITECTURE




# Fabric Service Redirection

- Application-centric **service graph** simplifies and scales service operations
- Packet match on a **redirection** rule sends the packet into a services graph.
- A **Service Graph** can be one or more service nodes pre-defined in a series.
- **Automated and scalable** L4-L7 service insertion



# Service Graph Definition


- Service Graphs are defined on the APIC. A service graph is a structure that defines the connectivity model between EPGs with one or more service nodes in between.
- The graphs can be a simple chain or involve splits, joins, taps, etc.
- Common services would be:
  - Firewall
  - IPS
  - TAP/Packet mirror
  - ADC/SLB



# Service & Application Health

The Service Appliance can generate a health rating

- **Device:** Score the health of the Device on a scale from 0(failing)-255(working). It is up to the DeviceScript to define the meaning of the score, the IFC will simply report it to the user.
- **Virtual Device:** Score the health of the VDev on a scale from 0-255. Similar to the Device health score.
- **Service Capacity:** The capacity of the Device is typically defined by licensing and the DeviceScript needs to report capacity to the IFC to prevent over provisioning.
- **Service Availability:** Memory, CPU, cluster health, response time statistics as available on the service device or cluster.



Fabric provides next generation of analytic functions

Per Application, Tenants and Infra:

- Health Scores
- Atomic Counters
- Latency
- Resources Consumption

Health Score tracks:


- Device
- Virtual Device
- Mem, CPU utilisation
- Service Capacity






## Demo Scenario

# Physical Topology



# Demo Flow



Northbound API

Tenant, EPG, and contract configuration, ASA and IPS instantiation, and security policy definition is scripted through APIC Northbound API

Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC)

ACI instantiates ASA and IPS services for the tenant and inserts these security devices into the application traffic path through service graph.

Policy contracts only permits TCP/1399 for the inter-EPG communication; all permitted packets are redirected through the defined service graph

EPG "web" should only connect to EPG "app" on port TCP/1399



## Demo: Application Centric Security





## Summary

# Summary

## Defend, Detect, Control

- Virtual network services
  - Extend policy
  - Extend Visibility
  - Extend Workflow
- Leverage P-to-V fabric services to create unified policy
- Assume both internal and external threats
- ACI
  - Automatically instantiate security services and policies right with the application flows



Q & A

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Additional Slides

# ASAv: Deployment Best Practices


- Stateful inspection at the edge or for inter-VM traffic
- Routed (L3) or transparent (L2) mode firewall
- Multi-tenant environments
- Cloud environments that require scalable, on demand, stateful access control or remote access VPN
- Where ASA1000V is deployed today
- Performance is based on underlying hardware: single ASAv consumes 1 vCPU and 2GB of RAM
- Maximum of 4 vCPUs, licensed accordingly

# VM Attributes Used by VSG (Partial List)

Name	Meaning	Source
vm.name	Name of this VM	vCenter
vm.host-name	Name of this ESX-host	vCenter
vm.os-fullname	Name of guest OS	vCenter
vm.vapp-name	Name of the associated vApp	vCenter
vm.cluster-name	Name of the cluster	vCenter
vm.portprofile-name	Name of the port-profile	Port-profile



# ASAv and VSG – 3 Tier Server Zone






# ASAv and VSG Compared

	ASAv with 4 vCPU	Virtual Security Gateway
Throughput	1-2GB stateful	vPath
Max Concurrent Sessions	500,000	256,000
Max Conns/Sec	20,000	6K-10K (1vCPU/2vCPU)
S2S VPN Sessions	750	NA
AnyConnect® Sessions	750	NA

VSG Deployment Guide: [http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/modules/ps2706/ps11208/deployment\\_guide\\_c07-647435.html](http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/modules/ps2706/ps11208/deployment_guide_c07-647435.html)


# Virtual Appliance

Inline



# Virtual IDS

## Passive



### Virtual Switch: vSwitch0

Virtual Machine Port Group		Physical Adapters	
VM Network		vmnic4	100 Full
Service Console			
vswif0 : 172.30.1.70			

### Virtual Switch: vSwitch1

Virtual Machine Port Group		Physical Adapters	
Management network		vmnic5	100 Full
2 virtual machine(s)			
Virtual Defense Center 4.9.1			
Virtual 3D Sensor 4.9.1			

### Virtual Switch: vSwitch2

Virtual Machine Port Group		Physical Adapters	
Server network		vmnic2	100 Half
3 virtual machine(s)			
Traffic Generator - Linux			
Windows Server 2008			
Ubuntu Linux Server 8.04			
Virtual Machine Port Group			
Promiscuous monitoring			
1 virtual machine(s)			
Virtual 3D Sensor 4.9.1			



# Cisco CTD Solution: Providing Scalable Visibility

Drilling into a single flow yields a plethora of information



Active Duration: 1 hour 39 minutes 58s (active for 1 hour 39 minutes 58s)  
 Feb 21, 2012 1:07:53 PM -> Feb 21, 2012 2:47:51 PM  
 (13 hours 47 minutes 3s ago) (12 hours 7 minutes 5s ago)

Client: 10.201.3.32  
 Host Groups: Houston, VLAN201, Los Angeles, Desktops  
 Country: RFC 1918  
 MAC Address: 5c:26:0a:48:97:2a (Dell Inc.)

Server: 8.12.2.18.254  
 Host Groups: United States  
 Country: United States  
 SRT Average: 55 ms (min: 3 ms, max: 213 ms)  
 Application Details: HTTP/1.1 200 OK.Cache-Con

Service Summary: http (tcp/80)  
 Application: NetFlix  
 97 TCP Connections

15.52M bytes (21.71k bps) in 377.71 Port 80

GET http://nflx.lid1b6b802x.lcdn.nflximg.com/446/482077446.jsmv/range/197216434-198258310?etime=20120222010254&movieHash=867&enocode=0bbdecc32da0f46ce7c7&random=

First Seen 51425  
 709.63k packets (118.31 pps)

992M bytes (1.25M bps) in 1.09M packets (181.28 pps)  
 RTT: 4 ms

Domain: NinjaNet  
 FlowCollector (10.202.3.111)




Quick View for Flow

Client Exporters IP (IF)


Server Exporters IP (IF)

Exporter	Export...	Interface	Direction	TTL	DSCP	Flow A...
10.202.3.112	FlowSensor	eth3	Inbound	127	best_effort	
lchqgw01 (10.201.0.1)	Exporter	VI1	Inbound		best_effort	
lchqgw01 (10.201.0.1)	Exporter	VI240	Outbound			
PrimaryASA (10.240.20.0.1)	Cisco ASA	WAN	Outbound			Permitted
PrimaryASA (10.240.20.0.1)	Cisco ASA	LAN	Inbound			Permitted
lchqgw01 (10.201.0.1)	Exporter	VI240	Inbound		best_effort	
lchqgw01 (10.201.0.1)	Exporter	VI1	Outbound			
10.202.3.112	FlowSensor	eth3	Inbound	47	best_effort	


# Flow-based Anomaly Detection



Collect & Analyse Flows



Establish Baseline of Behaviours



Alarm on Anomalies & Changes in Behaviour



**CISCO** <sup>TM</sup>