TOMORROW starts here.





Deploying Security Group Tags

BRKSEC-2690

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Secure Access & Mobility Product Group



Abstract

- This session will explain how TrustSec Security Group Tagging can be used to simplify access controls and provide software-defined segmentation.
- We will cover how to extend context-aware controls from the access layer to data centres in order to reduce operational effort, support compliance initiatives and facilitate BYOD.
- The session is targeted at network and security architects who want to know more about the TrustSec solution.



Introduction to Common Icons



Slide intended for your reference – may be very briefly covered



Identity Services Engine (ISE)



User authenticated by 802.1X, MAC auth-bypass or Web Auth



Agenda

- TrustSec SGT Overview and benefits
- SGT Classification
- SGT Propagation
- Policy Enforcement
- Use Cases
 - User to Data Centre Access Control
 - DC Segmentation
 - Campus and Branch Segmentation
- Case study
- Summary







TrustSec SGT Overview

Business Drivers for Improving Security Policy



Meet Compliance Objectives Authorise access to regulated apps to support compliance mandates



Increase Efficiency

Streamline security processes and reduce OpEx



Improve Productivity

Enable secure access to new applications and services while managing risk



Improving Security...

Strategies to mitigate APT





	9	(5)	Disable local administrator accounts to prevent network propagation using compromised local administrator cred		
10 (7) Network segmentation and segregation into security zones to protect sensitive information and crit					
L	-11	(6)	multi-ractor authentication especially implemented for remote access, or when the user is about to perform a privi		
	12	(8)	Software-based application firewall, blocking incoming network traffic that is malicious or otherwise unauthori		
	13	(9)	Software-based application firewall, blocking outgoing network traffic that is not generated by a whitelisted ap		
	14	(10)	Non-persistent virtualised sandboxed trusted operating environment, hosted outside of the organisation's inter-		

http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/top-mitigations/top35mitigations-2014-table.htm



TrustSec Security Group Tagging



Desired Policy

- Who can talk to whom
- Who can access protected assets
- How systems can talk to other systems

Protected Assets **Production** Development Internet Servers Servers Access **Employee** PERMIT DENY **PERMIT** (managed asset) PERMIT DENY **PERMIT** (Registered BYOD) **Employee** DENY **DENY PERMIT** (Unknown BYOD) **ENG VDI System** DENY PERMIT PERMIT





TrustSec Concept Users, Devices Classification Users, Devices Fin Servers SGT = 4

DC Switch

 Classification of systems/users based on context (user role, device, location, access method)

DC FW

The context-based classification propagates via a SGT

Router

 SGT used by firewalls, routers and switches to make intelligent forwarding or blocking decisions

SGT Propagation



SGT = 10

HR Servers

Cisco Public


SGT:5

Switch

SGT Assignment - BYOD Example

Classification Result:


Personal Asset SGT





Traditional Segmentation

Steps replicated across floors, buildings and sites




Simple Segmentation with 2 VLANs More Policies using more VLANs



User to Data Centre Access Control with TrustSec SGT

Regardless of topology or location, policy (Security Group Tag) stays with users, devices and servers




WLAN Data VLAN



Campus Segmentation with TrustSec SGT

 Enforcement is based on the Security Group Tag, can control communication in same VLAN




Traditional OpEx in Security Policy Maintenance



```
to SRV1 for HTTPS
           to SAP2 for SQL
deny
           to SCM2 for SSH
deny
           to SRV1 for HTTPS
       SF to SAP1 for SQL
deny
                                   ACL for 3 source objects & 3 destination objects
denv
          to SCM2 for SSH
permit LA to SRV1 for HTTPS
deny
       LA to SAP1 for SQL
denv
       LA to SAP for SSH
Permit SJC to SRV1 for HTTPS
deny
       SJC to SAP1 for SQL
                                   Adding source Object
denv
       SJC to SCM2 for SSH
deny
           to VDI
                    for RDP
                                   Adding destination Object
denv
           to VDI
                    for RDP
deny
       SJC to VDI
                    for RDP
```




Reduced OpEx in Policy Maintenance





Ease of Data Centre Provisioning
















SGT Classification

TrustSec Classification Options




- User/Device SGT assignments
 - Wired
 - Wireless
 - (RA VPN in beta)



Business Partners & 3rd party connections



How a SGT is Assigned





Classification Summary

Dynamic Classification



802.1X Authentication



Web Authentication

MAC Auth Bypass

Common Classification for Mobile Devices

Static Classification


- IP Address
- VLANs
- Subnets
- L2 Interface
- L3 Interface
- Virtual Port Profile
- Layer 2 Port Lookup



Common Classification for Servers, Topology-based policy, etc.

ISE Dynamic SGT Assignments








Dynamic Classification Process in Detail





Static Classification



IOS CLI Example

IP to SGT mapping

cts role-based sgt-map A.B.C.D sgt SGT_Value

VLAN to SGT mapping*

cts role-based sgt-map vlan-list VLAN sgt SGT_Value

Subnet to SGT mapping

cts role-based sgt-map A.B.C.D/nn sgt SGT_Value

L2IF to SGT mapping*

(config-if-cts-manual)#policy static sgt SGT_Value

L3IF to SGT mapping**

cts role-based sgt-map interface name sgt SGT_Value

L3 ID to Port Mapping**

(config-if-cts-manual)#policy dynamic identity name


* relies on IP Device Tracking** relies on route prefix snooping



Layer 3 Interface to SGT Mapping (L3IF-SGT) Sup2T introduced in 15.0(1)SY




- Route Prefix Monitoring on a specific Layer 3 Port mapping to a SGT
- Can apply to Layer 3 interfaces regardless of the underlying physical interface:
 - Routed port, SVI (VLAN interface), Tunnel interface



Nexus 1000V 2.1 – SGT Assignment

- Port Profile
 - Container of network properties
 - Applied to different interfaces
- Server Admin may assign Port Profiles to new VMs
- VMs inherit network properties of the portprofile including SGT
- SGT stays with the VM even if moved









Port Profiles assigned to VMs

Nexus1000VSXP#	sho cts	ipsgt	entries		
Interface	SGT		IP ADDRESS	VRF	Learnt
Vethernet1	8		10.1.100.121	-	Device Tracking
Vethernet2	7		10.1.100.120	-	Device Tracking
Vethernet3	5		10.1.100.98	-	Device Tracking
Vethernet4	6				
Vethernet5	3		10.1.3.108	-	Device Tracking
Vethernet6	6		10.1.3.113	-	Device Tracking






SGT Assignment – Access Layer Classification

		Cat2960-S	Cat3750X	Cat3850/5760	Cat4K S7	Cat6x00	ISR	WLC	Notes
Dynamic	802.1X	X	Х	Х	X	X	X	Х	
	MAB	X	X	Х	X	X	X	Х	
	Web Auth	X	Х	Х	X	X	X	X	
Static	VLAN/SGT	-	X *	Х	X	X *	-	-	
	Subnet/SGT	-	-	Х	X	X	-	-	Via Sup2T
	Layer 3 Identity to Port Mapping	-	-		-	X	-	-	Based on routes learned from port via dynamic routing



^{* -} limits on the number of VLANs per platform

Key TrustSec Functions



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




SGT Propagation

Propagation Option 1: Inline Tagging

- SGT embedded within Cisco Meta Data (CMD) in Layer 2 frame
- Capable switches understands and process SGT at line-rate
- Optional MACsec protection
- No impact to QoS, IP MTU/Fragmentation
- L2 Frame Impact: ~40 bytes
- Recommend L2 MTU~6000 bytes
- N.B. Incapable devices will drop frames with unknown Ethertype



ETHTYPE:0x88E5



SGT Link Authentication and Authorisation

Mode	MACSEC	MACSEC Pairwise Master Key (PMK)	MACSEC Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)	Encryption Cipher Selection (no-encap, null, GCM, GMAC)	Trust/Propagation Policy for Tags
cts dot1x	Y	Dynamic	Dynamic	Negotiated	Dynamic from ISE/configured
cts manual – with encryption	Y	Static	Dynamic	Static	Static
cts manual – no encryption	N	N/A	N/A	N/A	Static



- CTS Manual is <u>strongly</u> recommended configuration for SGT propagation
 - "cts dot1x" takes link down with AAA down. Tight coupling of link state and AAA state
 - Some platforms (ISRG2, ASR1K, N5K) only support cts manual/no encryption

Configure Links for SGT Tagging



CTS Manual no encryption

interface TenGigabitEthernet1/5
 cts manual
 policy static sgt 2 trusted


C6K2T-CORE-1#sho cts interface brief Global Dot1x feature is Enabled Interface GigabitEthernet1/1: CTS is enabled, mode: MANUAL IFC state: OPEN Authentication Status: NOT APPLICABLE Peer identity: "unknown" Peer's advertised capabilities: "" Authorization Status: SUCCEEDED Peer SGT: 2:device sqt Peer SGT assignment: Trusted NOT APPLICABLE SAP Status: Propagate SGT: Enabled Cache Info: Expiration : N/A Cache applied to link : NONE

L3 IPM: disabled.

Always "shut" and "no shut" and interface for any cts manual or cts dot1x change

Propagation Option 2: SGT eXchange Protocol (SXP)

- Control plane protocol that conveys the IP-SGT map of authenticated hosts to enforcement points
- SXP uses TCP as the transport layer
- Accelerate deployment of SGT
- Support Single Hop SXP & Multi-Hop SXP (aggregation)
- Two roles: Speaker (initiator) and Listener (receiver)





Propagation option 2: SGT eXchange Protocol (SXP)

- SXP accelerates deployment of SGTs
 - Allows classification at the access edge without hardware upgrade
 - Allows communication from access edge to enforcement device
- SXP also used to traverse networks/devices without SGT capabilities
- Uses TCP for transport protocol
- TCP port 64999 for connection initiation
- Use MD5 for authentication and integrity check
- Two roles: Speaker (initiator) and Listener (receiver)

Nexus1000VSXP# sh cts sxp conn PEER_IP_ADDR VRF 10.1.2.1 management

PEER_SXP_MODE listener


SELF_SXP_MODE speaker

CONNECTION STATE connected



SXP Flow





SXP Informational Draft



draft-smith-kandula-sxp-00 - IETF Tools - Internet Engineering Task ... ○ tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-kandula-sxp-00 ▼


3 days ago - Internet-Draft Source-Group Tag eXchange Protocol (SXP) January 2014 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document ...

- SXP now published as an Informational Draft to the IETF, based on customer requests
- Draft called 'Source-Group Tag eXchange Protocol' because of likely uses beyond security
- Specifies SXP v4 functionality with backwards compatibility to SXP v2
- http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-smith-kandula-sxp-00.txt



SXP Connection Types





IOS SXP Configuration



```
3750
cts sxp enable
cts sxp connection peer 10.1.44.1 source
10.1.11.44 password default mode local
! SXP Peering to Cat6K
cts sxp enable
cts sxp default password cisco123
cts sxp connection peer 10.10.11.1 source
10.1.44.1 password default mode local listener
hold-time 0 0
! ^^ Peering to Cat3K
cts sxp connection peer 10.1.44.44 source
10.1.44.1 password default mode local listener
hold-time 0 0
! ^^ SXP Peering to WLC
```

```
TP Address
                   Security Group
10.10.11.1
                   2:device sat
                                                           INTERNAL
10.10.11.100
                   8:EMPLOYEE FULL
                                                           LOCAL
C6K2T-CORE-1#show cts sxp connections brief
                  : Enabled
 Highest Version Supported: 4
 Default Password: Set
 Default Source IP: Not Set
Connection retry open period: 120 secs
Reconcile period: 120 secs
Retry open timer is not running
Peer IP
                 Source IP
                                  Conn Status
                                                    Duration
10.1.11.44
                 10.1.44.1
                                                    11:28:14:59 (dd:hr:mm:sec)
10.1.44.44
                 10.1.44.1
                                                    22:56:04:33 (dd:hr:mm:sec)
Total num of SXP Connections = 2
C6K2T-CORE-1#show cts role-based sqt-map all details
Active IP-SGT Bindings Information
TP Address
                   Security Group
                                                          Source
10.1.40.10
                   5:PCI Servers
10.1.44.1
                   2:Device sqt
--- snip ---
                   3:GUEST
10.0.200.203
                                                           SXP
10.10.11.100
                   8:EMPLOYEE FULL
                                                           SXP
```

C3750#show cts role-based sqt-map all details


Active IP-SGT Bindings Information

WLC SXP Configuration





Inline Tagging vs. SXP Tag Propagation




Inline Tagging: If Device supports SGT in ASICs

• **SXP:** If there are devices are not SGT-capable



SXP IP-SGT Binding Table

Key TrustSec Functions




· Inline SGT on all ISRG2 except 800 series:






Policy Enforcement

Policy Enforcement - Security Group ACL (SGACL)




Centralised SGACL Policy Management in ISE



SGACL Egress Policy Enforcement

- Extended ACL syntax, without IP addresses
- Avoids TCAM impact, can be IPv6 agnostic*
- Can be applied anywhere (no IP dependency)
- Switches that classify servers only download SGACLs they need from ISE
- No device-specific ACL configs



^{*} Currently only Cat6k Sup 2T supports IPv6 SGACL

Environment Data



```
TS2-6K-DIST#show cts environment-data
CTS Environment Data
=============
Current state = COMPLETE
Last status = Successful
Local Device SGT:
 SGT tag = 2-00
Server List Info:
Installed list: CTSServerList1-0004, 3 server(s):
 *Server: 10.1.100.3, port 1812, A-ID 04FB30FE056125FE90A340C732ED9530
         Status = ALIVE
          auto-test = FALSE, idle-time = 60 mins, deadtime = 20 secs
 *Server: 10.1.100.4, port 1812, A-ID 04FB30FE056125FE90A340C732ED9530
          Status = ALIVE
          auto-test = FALSE, idle-time = 60 mins, deadtime = 20 secs
 *Server: 10.1.100.6, port 1812, A-ID 04FB30FE056125FE90A340C732ED9530
          Status = ALIVE
          auto-test = FALSE, idle-time = 60 mins, deadtime = 20 secs
Multicast Group SGT Table:
Security Group Name Table:
 0001-30 :
   2-98 : 80 -> Device SGT
   unicast-unknown-98 : 80 -> Unknown
   Any : 80 -> ANY
Transport type = CTS TRANSPORT IP UDP
Environment Data Lifetime = 86400 secs
Last update time = 20:56:48 UTC Mon Sep 26 2011
Env-data expires in 0:23:59:59 (dd:hr:mm:sec)
Env-data refreshes in 0:23:59:59 (dd:hr:mm:sec)
Cache data applied
                             = NONE
State Machine is running
```



Activating SGACL Enforcement on IOS switch



 After setting up SGT/SGACL on ISE, you can now enable SGACL Enforcement on IOS switch

Defining IP to SGT mapping for servers

```
Switch(config) #cts role-based sgt-map 10.1.40.10 sgt 5
Switch(config) #cts role-based sgt-map 10.1.40.20 sgt 6
Switch(config) #cts role-based sgt-map 10.1.40.30 sgt 7
```

Enabling SGACL Enforcement Globally and for VLAN

```
Switch(config)#cts role-based enforcement
Switch(config)#cts role-based enforcement vlan-list 40
```

Distribution 6K – Sup2T - Enabling Ingress Reflector to support SGACL on legacy linecard (if there is any)

```
Switch(config) #platform cts ingress
CTS Ingress reflector will be active only on next system reboot.
Please reboot the system for CTS Ingress reflector to be active.
```


Enabling reflector requires system to reboot.






Downloading SGACL Policy on IOS Switch

Verify SGACL Content



Policy Enforcement on Firewalls: ASA SG-FW






SG-FW Simplifying ASA Rules and Operations

Source		Destination	Action		
IP	SGT	IP	SGT	Port	Action
Any	Web Server		PCI Servers	SQL	Allow
Any	Audit users		PCI Servers	TCP	Allow
Any	Developers	Any	Dev VDI Systems	Any	Deny

- Policies can use Security Groups for user roles and server roles
- Moves and changes do not require IP-address rule-changes
- New servers/users just require group membership to be established
- Rule-base reduction with Groups instead of IP addresses can be significant
- Common classification method for campus and data centre
- Simplified auditing for compliance purposes




Using SG-FW and SGACL Enforcement Together



- Consistent Classification/enforcement between Firewalls and switching.
- SGT Names will be synchronised between ISE and ASDM
- Policy administrators need to ensure SGACL and SG-FW rules are in sync



Logging TrustSec Policy Enforcement



- SG-FW gives richer logging, e.g. URL logging
- Switch logging is best effort via syslog (e.g. N7000) or NetFlow (C6500 Sup2T)
- SGACL counters vary per switch platform
 - Per SGT/DGT on Nexus 7000/Cat6500 Sup2T
 - Per Platform on Nexus 5500



Cisco Public

Key TrustSec Functions



Inline SGT on all ISRG2 except 800 series:
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Cisco

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TrustSec Platform Support

Classification Propagation Enforcement Catalyst 2960-S/-C/-Plus/-X/-XR Catalyst 2960S/C/Plus/X/XR Catalyst 3560-X **SGACL** Catalyst 3750-X Catalyst 3560-E/-C/-X Catalyst 3560-E/-C/, 3750-E Catalyst 3750-E/-X Catalyst 3560-X, 3750-X Catalyst 3850 NEW Catalyst 3850 Catalyst 3850 WLC 5760 WLC 5760 Catalyst 4500E (Sup6E) Catalyst 4500E (7E) Catalyst 4500E (Sup6E/7E) Catalyst 4500E (7E), 4500X Catalyst 6500E (2T) Catalyst 6500E (Sup720/2T) 000000 Catalyst 6500E (Sup720) Catalyst 6800 Wireless LAN Controller Catalyst 6500E(2T) & 6800 SGACL 2500/5500/WiSM2 **Nexus** 7000 Nexus 7000 WLC 2500, 5500, WiSM2 Nexus 5500 Nexus 5500 WLC 5760 NEW Nexus 1000v Nexus 1000v ISR G2, CGR2000 Nexus 5500/22xx FEX ASR 1000 Router ISR G2, CGR2000 Nexus 7000/22xx FEX CSR1000v Router ASA5500 (VPN RAS) ISRG2* CGR2000 Beta ASA 5500 & ASA-SM **ASR1000 ASAv** ASA5500 Firewall, ASASM

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
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Extract from TrustSec Platform Support Matrix

Platform	Solution Minimum Version	Solution-Level Validated Version	SGT Classification	Control Plane Propagation (SXP)	SGT over Ethernet (Inline SGT)	SGT over MACsec	SGT over xVPN (for WAN)	SGT Enforcement
Cisco Catalyst 2960S/SF Series(LAN Base required)	IOS 15.0(1)SE2	IOS 15.0(2)SE2	Dynamic,IP- SGT,VLAN- SGT	SXP (speaker only)	No	No	No	No
Cisco Catalyst 3560- X,3750-X(IP Base required)	IOS 15.0(1)SE2	IOS 15.0(2)SE4	Dynamic,IP- SGT,VLAN- SGT	SXP (S/L)	Yes	Yes (with C3KX - SM-10G)	No	SGACL
Cisco Catalyst 6500 (Sup-2T)(IP Base required)	IOS 15.0(1)SY1	IOS 15.1(1)SY1	Dynamic,IP- SGT,VLAN- SGT,Subnet- SGT,L3IF- SGT	SXP (S/L)	Yes (requires WS- X69xx line card)	Yes (with Sup2T built-in ports and WS- X69xx	No	SGACL
line cards and chassis	NX -OS 6.1(1) (SGT support in base license from 6.1)	NX -OS 6.2(2)	Static IP- SGT,L2IF- SGT, Port Profile-SGT	SXP (S/L)	Yes	Yes (All line cards except F1 and F2 line cards)	No	SGACL 64

Inline Tagging & Enforcement

Normal LinkIn-line SGT Tagging



Deployment Questions


- Where do I start?
- How do I define the roles needed for my organisation?
- What about all my network devices that don't support SGT inline tagging?
- How should I assign SGTs?

Frequent discussion topics before deployments:

- Identifying use-cases have least HW/upgrade dependency, which are often deployed first
 - E.g. User to DC Access Control
- How we can assign tags in a passive manner then enforce selectively
- Relative ease of adding more roles later




Typical Deployment Approach



- 1. User connects to network, Monitor mode allows traffic from before authentication
- 2. Authentication is performed and results are logged by ISE



Typical Deployment Approach



- 1. User connects to network, Monitor mode allows traffic from before authentication
- 2. Authentication is performed and results are logged by ISE
- 3. Traffic traverse to Data Centre and hits SGACL at egress enforcement point
- 4. SGACLs may be enabled gradually on a destination SGT basis








Use Cases: User to DC Access Control

User to Data Centre Access Control






Key SXP Scaling Information to Understand

Platform	Max SXP Connections	Max IP-SGT bindings
Catalyst 6500 Sup2T/ 6800	2000	200,000
Nexus 7000	980	200,000
Catalyst 4500 Sup 7E	1000	256,000
Catalyst 4500-X / 4500 Sup 7LE	1000	64,000
ASA 5585-X SSP60	1000	100,000
ASA 5585-X SSP40	500	50,000
Catalyst 3850/WLC 5760	128	12,000

User to DC Access Control – Campus Enforcement



Catalyst 2960-S/-C/-Plus/-X/-XR

Catalyst 3560-E/-C/, 3750-E

Catalyst 3560-X, 3750-X

Catalyst 3850

Catalyst 4500E (Sup6E)

Catalyst 4500E (7E), 4500X

Catalyst 6500E (Sup720)

Catalyst 6500E (2T)

WLC 2500, 5500, WiSM2

WLC 5760

SXP
SXP
SXP
SGT
SXP
SGACL
SXP
SXP
SGT
SXP
SXP
SGT
SXP
SGACL
SXP
SXP
SGACL
SXP
SXP
SGACL
SXP
SXP
SGACL
SXP
SYP
SGT


Campus Core Switch: Catalyst 6500E (2T) Catalyst 4500 Sup7(L3 cfg)

WLAN/Unified Access: Catalyst 3850 WLC 5760 Classify destination SGTs in enforcement device using:

- Subnet-SGT mappings
- IP-SGT mappings



User to DC Access Control – DC Switch Enforcement



Catalyst 2960-S/-C/-Plus/-X/-XR

Catalyst 3560-E/-C/, 3750-E

Catalyst 3560-X, 3750-X

Catalyst 3850

Catalyst 4500E (Sup6E)

Catalyst 4500E (7E), 4500X

Catalyst 6500E (Sup720)

Catalyst 6500E (2T)

WLC 2500, 5500, WiSM2

WLC 5760

SXP SGT SGT SXP

CLASSIFY SERVERS WITH:

Nexus 1000v Port Profile SGT mappings


- VMs are associated with Nexus 1000V Port Profiles
- N1000v sends SGT assignment to N7000s

Nexus 7000


- VLAN SGT mappings
- IP-SGT used for physical servers:
- IP Mappings pushed from ISE to N7000 switches

Nexus 5500/2200(FEX)

- Port-SGT mappings used for physical servers



User to DC Access Control – SG-Firewall



PROPAGATION

SXP to ASA

CLASSIFY SERVERS WITH:

IP Firewall rule entries

SXP from Nexus 1000v/5500/7000:

- Nexus 1000v **Port Profile SGT** mappings
- Nexus 7000 VLAN SGT mappings
 IP-SGT mappings (can be from ISE)
- Nexus 5500/2200 IP-SGT mappings (can be from ISE)







Use Cases: Data Centre Segmentation

Data Centre Segmentation




- Segment servers into logical zones
- Control access to logical DC entities based on role
- Apply controls to physical and virtual systems (virtual servers, VDI..


Sample server groups:

- Production, Development, User Acceptance Test
- Export Controlled data
- Engineering vs. Business Servers
- PCI compliance-critical



Data Centre Segmentation








Nexus 7000 / Nexus 1000v Interaction

- Nexus 1000v Port Profile assignment sent to N7000 over SXP (N7k SXP listener)
- N7000 can also send server mappings to ASA over SXP (N7k SXP speaker)




Nexus1000VSXP# Interface	sho cts SGT	ipsgt		ies ADDRESS	١	VRF	 Learnt	
Vethernet1	8		10.1	.100.121		_	Device 7	Tracking
Vethernet2	7		10.1	.100.120		-	Device 7	Tracking
Vethernet3	5		10.1	.100.98		-	Device 7	Tracking
Vethernet4	6							_
Vethernet5	3		10.1	.3.108		-	Device 7	Tracking
Vethernet6	6		10.1	.3.113		-	Device 7	Tracking

Adding Static IP-SGT Mappings

- Nexus 7000 can also classify servers by IP address to SGT mapping
- Mappings can be defined in the switch:-

cts role-based sgt-map A.B.C.D sgt SGT_Value

- Mappings can also be pushed from ISE
- N7000 can also send server mappings to ASA over SXP (N7k speaker)






Adding VLAN-SGT Maps

 Classify servers by VLAN they are attached to

cts role-based sgt-map vlan-list VLAN sgt SGT_Value


 N7000 will still derive IP-SGT maps from VLANs and send to ASA




Using Nexus 5500 for Physical Servers

- Nexus 5500 with N2200 FEX
- All SGT processing on N5500
- SGT assignments applied in N5k SGACLs are port-based
- Policy static SGT assigned on interface

interface Ethernet1/20 cts manual policy static sqt <value>




- To send mappings over SXP will also require IP-SGT maps on N5500
- N5500 is not an SXP listener






Server Classifications

- Nexus 1000v Port Profile SGT mappings
- Nexus 7000 VLAN SGT mappings
- Nexus 7000 IP-SGT mappings
- Nexus 5500 Port-SGT assignments for inline tagging/SGACLs
- Nexus 5500 IP-SGT mappings to send via SXP






Using SG-FW and SGACL Together in the DC



- SGACL on switches enforcing policy within each Risk Level
- ASA enforcing policy between Risk Levels (with IP/SGT mappings supplied from switch infrastructure)

Combining SGACL and SG-FW in the Data Centre

- SGT provides common policy objects used throughout FW and ACL rules
- Centralised SGACL definition & automation
- SGT can be propagated to other DCs to further simplify policy
- New SGACL batch programming (needs enabling) & Fragmented SGACL downloads
 - N7000 6.2(6)
 - N5500 6.0(2)N2
- New SGT caching + 200k IP-SGT mappings in N7000 6.2(6)



SGACL Guidelines for DC Deployments



- Nexus 7000 16,000 Access Control Entries available
- Nexus 5500 has constraints:
 - 124 SGACL TCAM entries available per bank of 8 ports
 - The sum of the SGACL entries per 8 port bank cannot contain more than 124 permissions in total (diagram shows 3 + 9 as an example)
 - SGACL can be reused extensively 2000+ SGT,DGT combinations on a N5500 reusing 124 lines of permissions tested


WEB-ACL: permit tcp dst eq 443 permit tcp dst eq 80 deny ip

```
Permit tcp dst eq 443
permit tcp dst eq 80
permit tcp dst eq 22
permit tcp dst eq 135
permit tcp dst eq 136
permit tcp dst eq 137
permit tcp dst eq 138
permit tcp des eq 139
deny ip
```



SGT Caching

- Possible 3rd party devices for Server Load Balancing (SLB), Intrusion Prevention Services (IPS), etc
- Caches IP-SGT mappings from data plane
- Passes untagged traffic through services
- Re-tags traffic after service with cached SGT



8

SRC:10.65.1.9




SGT Caching

The cached IP-SGT mappings from data plane CAN be used with SXP

Can send cached IP-SGT mappings to ASA in SXP

IP Address

10.65.1.9



8

SRC:10.65.1.9

DST: 10.1.100.52

SGT Tagged Traffic Untagged Traffic SXP



SGACL enabled Device


SGT






Use Cases: Campus and Branch Segmentation

Campus and Branch Segmentation




*LoB = Line of Business

LOGICAL VIEW







Restricting Malware Recon/Propagation



Restricting Malware Recon/Propagation



Campus Segmentation




SGACL segmentation available on :-

- Catalyst 3560-X, 3750-X
- Catalyst 3850
- Catalyst 4500E (7E), 4500X
- Catalyst 6500E (2T)
- WLC 5760

- Other WLC platforms can also be configured to forward all P2P traffic into SGACL-capable switch for policy enforcement
- SXP from WLC to switch propagates role info for the Wireless users




Implementing Wireless User – User Policy Enforcement




 Apply user-user policies as defined in ISE on traffic from the WLC

Implementing Wireless User – User Policy Enforcement




 Apply user-user policies as defined in ISE on traffic from the WLC



Implementing Wireless User – User Policy Enforcement



 If inline tagging is enabled between the switches – user to user policies applied to WLAN users across the campus








Deployment Mode	Controller Platforms	TrustSec Support	Release
Centralised AireOS	2504, 5508 WiSM2	SXP	7.4 onwards
Centralised IOS	5760	SGT, SGACL SXP	IOS XE 3.3.0 SE
Converged Access IOS	3850, 3650	SGT, SGACL SXP	IOS XE 3.3.0 SE
FlexConnect	5508, WiSM2 8510, 7510	None - could use VLAN-SGT mapping as workaround	



Extending Inline Tagging Across WAN to Branches

- Inline tagging across WAN :
 - ISR G2 IOS 15.4(1)T &
 - ASR1000 15.4(1)S
- Inline tagging on built-in ISRG2 & ASR 1000 Ethernet interfaces (all except 800 series ISR)
- Carries SGT inline across GET-VPN and IPsec VPN




- Can also use SGT-aware Zone-based Firewall in branch and DC WAN edge for reasons like PCI compliance
- SGT allows more dynamic classification in the branch and DC WAN edge
- SGT is a source criteria only in ISR FW, Source or Dest in ASR 1000



Extending SXP Across WAN


- Bidirectional SXP with Loop Detection available now:
 - ISRG2 15.3(2)T
 - ASR1000 IOS XE 3.9
- Allows ASR1000 to be an IP/SGT relay from remote to remote
- SXP is a full replication model – each remote router will learn all IP/SGT bindings with this approach






Extending SXP Across WAN

- Bidirectional SXP with Loop Detection available now:
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 - ASR1000 IOS XE 3.9
- Allows ASR1000 to be an IP/SGT relay from remote to remote
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Data Centre












Case Study

Compliance Use-case

- Meeting compliance requirements with minimal deployment impact
- Use TrustSec to enforce policy on:
 - User to DC access controls
 - DC Segmentation
 - User Segmentation
 - Business partner access
- Security Group Tags applied to
 - Users
 - Servers
 - Business partners
 - 3rd party connections




Classifying Access


- SGTs assigned to L3 interfaces
 - All traffic on a given interface tagged as from that business partner
- Subnet to SGT mappings
 - SGT assigned to selected subnets of external networks

User/Device classifications

- 802.1X Monitor Mode/Low-impact mode
- Profiling & MAC-Auth-Bypass



Classifications – in Data Centres




Servers and virtual desktops classified using:-

- IP-SGT used for servers:
 - Mappings pushed from ISE to N7000 switches
- Port Profile SGT mappings
 - New VMs are associated with Nexus 1000V Port Profiles
 - N1000v sends SGT assignment to N7000s
- VLAN SGT mappings
 - (N7000 for some virtual systems)
- Port SGT mappings used for physical servers
 - (N5500 / N2000 / various FEX)



Policy Matrix















PCI Compliance

PCI Compliance - 'Scope Reduction'







PCI Compliance

Verizon Opinion and Recommendations

Based on the results of the PCI validation and PCI Internal Network Penetration and Segmentation Test, it is Verizon's opinion that Cisco TrustSec can successfully perform network segmentation, for purposes of PCI scope reduction. In order to ensure effective enforcement across the environment in which TrustSec is deployed, it is important to note that proper configuration of the supporting infrastructure and TrustSec policies is essential.

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns170/ns896/ns1051/trustsec_pci_validation.pdf



Use Case 1: PCI Scope Reduction with SGT-Wired

Legend:




Segmentation enforcement



PCI scope

All devices in same VLAN





Use Case 2: PCI Scope Reduction with SGT-WLAN

Legend:




Segmentation enforcement



PCI scope

All devices in same VLAN and SSID





3: PCI Scope Reduction - Branch and Data Centre


Legend:



Segmentation enforcement



PCI scope















Summary

Summary

- TrustSec can be deployed for multiple use-cases
 - Can start with specific use-cases with minimal platform dependencies
 - Non-disruptive deployments; SGACL enforcement can be enabled incrementally and gradually via the policy matrix
- TrustSec SGT can mean
 - Centralised policy for complete network
 - Distributed enforcement and scale
 - No device-specific ACLs or rules to manage one place to audit
 - Servers can cycle through Dev>UAT> Prod without readdressing
- Operational benefits
 - SGACLs avoid VLAN/dACL efforts and admin
 - Security policy managers/auditors do not need to understand the topology or the underlying technology to use the policy matrix
 - Firewall rule simplification and OpEx reduction
 - Faster and easier deployment of new services



Links

- For more info:
 - http://www.cisco.com/go/trustsec
- TrustSec platform support matrix
 - http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/enterprisenetworks/trustsec/trustsec matrix.html
- TrustSec and ISE Deployment Guides:
 - http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/ns340/ns414/ns742/ns744/landing_DesignZone_ TrustSec.html
- PCI Scope Reduction with Cisco TrustSec QSA (Verizon) Validation:
 - http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns170/ns896/ns1051/trustsec_pci_validation.pdf
- IETF SXP Draft:
 - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-kandula-sxp-00



Ciscolive!









Q & A


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